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Union Required? 
ANN c. HODGES* 
Jn' Wright v. Universal Maritime Se~ice Corp., 1 the Supreme Court held 
that a union waiver of an emplOyee~s right to a judicial forum for a statutory 
cause of action must be clear·and unequivocal.2 While I have argued that the 
, , 
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author thanks Professor Matthew 
Finkin, Professor Martin Malin, arid Paul M. Thompson, Hunton & Williams, for 
valuable coniments on earlier drafts. In addition, the article'benefited from the input of 
the participants at the OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION Symposium 2000 
and the participants at the University of Richmond Faculty and John Marshall Scholars 
Colloquy. Michele D. Henry and Cindy L. Press,ley, Class of 2001, University of 
Richmond, provided valuable research assistance. Any errors herein are attributable to 
the author. 
1 Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 52S U.S. 70 (1998). 
2 Id. at 80. While the requirement that a waiver be clear and unequivocal is a 
necessary prerequisite to precluding judicial litigation, it is not necessarily sufficient. A 
court might also require that the individual lmowingly waive the right. See Jan William 
Stumer, Arbitration, Labor Contracts, anil the ADA: the Benefits of Pre-Dispute 
Arbitration Agreements and an Update on the Conflict Between the Duty to 
Accommodate and Seniority Rights, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 455, 485 (1999). 
Some level of fairness and perhaps rough equivalence to the judicial process might also 
be required. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(refusing to compel employee to arbitrate because Hooters breached the agreement "by 
promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete default of its 
contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith." Among the 
unfair rules cited by the court were the requirement that the arbitrators be selected from a 
panel chosen exclusively by Hooters; a requirement that the employee, but not Hooters, 
give notice of the claim, its basis, all witnesses, and their testimony; and a provision that 
Hooters, but not the employee, could challenge the arbitration decision in court); Cole v. 
Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding agreement to 
arbitrate statutory claims because it provided for neutral arbitrators, more than minimal 
discovery, a written award, all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in 
court, and employer payment of fees and costs. The court.indicated that it would not 
enforce an agreement that required an employee to- pay any of the costs of arbitration to 
vindicate a statutory claim). It is likely that the arbitration process under the collective 
bargaining agreement would meet most of the fairness or judicial equivalence 
requirements imposed by courts to date, with two possible exceptions. Generally, formal 
discovery is not available in labor arbitration, although the parties may exchange 
information voluntarily during the grievance process or obtain information through the 
right to information under the National Labor Relations Act. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., 
ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 224-26 (2000). In some cases, the collective bargaining 
513 
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 16:3 2001) 
union should not be permitted to waive the individual employees' rights to a 
judicial forum,3 the Court declined to decide that issue, deeming it 
unnecessary for purposes of the case.4 Prior to the Wright decision, only the 
Fourth Circuit had held that such a waiver was permissible; since Wright, the 
Fourth Circuit has maintained that position, providing guidance as to the 
contractual language that would constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver 
under Wright. s 
Given employer interest in confining employees to the arbitral forum,6 
some unionized employers undoubtedly will seek to negotiate language in 
the collective bargaining agreement that requires employees to arbitrate their 
statutory claims. Alternatively, some unionized employers may seek to 
agreement may provide for some discovery or the arbitrator may order discovery. Id. at 
225-27. In addition, labor arbitrators have been generally reluctant to award punitive 
damages and attorneys' fees. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How 
ARBITRATION WORKS 589, 592 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997). 
Indeed, the authority to award punitive damages is in some doubt in the absence of an 
express contractual provision authorizing such damages. Id. at 589-90 (noting that courts 
disagree regarding the power of arbitrators to award punitive damages in the absence of 
contractual authorization). While there has been little litigation of the adequacy of 
collectively bargained arbitration procedures for statutory claims, these issues may give 
some courts pause. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991 ), specifically sanctioned arbitration of a statutory claim in 
the nonunion context where discovery was more limited than in litigation. Id. at 31. The 
Gilmer Court also considered the damages limitation issue but decided that the arbitral 
rules at bar did not limit available relief. Id. at 32. For further discussion of these issues, 
see Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not 
Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. REsOL. 589 (2001). 
3 See Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The 
Fourth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & 
EMP. POL'Y J. 123 (1998). Should that view ultimately prevail in the Supreme Court, a 
union waiver would almost certainly not be a mandatory subject of bargaining; it would 
be classified as a permissive or illegal subject. However, even if the union cannot waive 
the right, the issue of whether the employer could impose such a waiver on unionized 
employees would remain. In addition, the union might demand to bargain over the 
arbitration procedure for statutory claims. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int') v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing en bane, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'I, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (Mar. 9. 
2000) (Nos. 98-7196 & 98-7202), available at 
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/anker.pdf. The judgment in Air Line Pilots 
Ass 'n, Int 'I was vacated in response to a petition for rehearing en bane, but on rehearing 
the court reinstated the opinion as judgment and opinion of the court en bane. 211 F.3d 
1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
4 Wright, 525 U.S. at 82. 
5 Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999). 
6 See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN 
EMPLOYMENT9 (1997). 
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impose waivers on unionized employees individually without bargaining 
with the union.7 A crucial determinant in the success of such efforts will be 
whether the arbitration of statutory claims is found to be a mandatory subject 
of bargaining. The classification of a subjept as mandatory or permissive 
determines whether the negotiating parties can insist to impasse _on inclusion 
of a provision in the agreement· and, in most cases, whether the party can 
implement the provision upon impasse. In addition, the classification 
significantly impacts the question of whether the employer c~ negotiate 
individually with employees about a subject. 
This article analyzes the question of whether arbitration of statutory 
claims should be classified as a mandatory or permissive subject of 
bargaining under the National Labor ~elations Act (NLRA). s First, this 
article reviews the post-Wright cases that hold that a union-negotiated waiver 
is permissible. Second, this article reviews the only decision to consider the 
issue of classification of the bargaining subject, Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, 
International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,9 a case arising in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under the Railway Labor 
Act.IO In that case, the court concluded that the matter was not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining because the union could not lawfully waive the 
employees' right to litigate. I I The court went on to hold that the employer 
lawfully imposed the arbitration agreements on probationary pilots 
individually, rejecting the union's argument .that bargaining with the union 
was required.12 Because the D.C. Circuit's opinion was based on its 
conclusion that a union waiver is impermissible, I3 this article proceeds to 
consider the appropriate analysis under the NLRA if a union waiver is not 
prohibited. To answer this question, this article analyzes the case law under 
the NLRA on mandatory bargaining subjects. This article concludes that, 
although all aspects of the arbitration procedure are mandatory bargaining 
subjects, the waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum is not. Having 
reached that conclusion, this article goes on to determine whether the 
employer, consistent with the NLRA, may impose arbitration agreements 
upon individual employees who are represented by a union, with or without 
negotiation with the employees. Since statutory arbitration is substantially 
intertwined with contractual arbitration due to overlap in the subjects to be 
7 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'[, 199 F.3d at485. 
8 29 u.s.c. § 151-69 (1994) 
9 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'I v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
10 45 u.s.c. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1994). 
11 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'[, 199 F.3d at485-86. 
I2 Id. at 486. 
I3 Id. at 485-86. 
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arbitrated, this article concludes that the employer cannot bypass the union 
and impose statutory arbitration on the employees directly. Nevertheless, 
there remains a role for statutory arbitration in the unionized workplace if the 
employer, employees, and union agree that it would be of mutual benefit. 
I. ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS IN THE UNIONIZED 
WORKPLACE AFTER WRIGHT 
Interpreting Wright, the Fourth Circuit has defined two methods by 
which a collective bargaining agreement can clearly and unequivocally waive 
the right to litigate a statutory claim.14 The collective bargaining agreement's 
arbitration clause could provide specifically that employees agree to arbitrate 
all federal claims arising out of employment. Alternatively, where the 
arbitration clause applies to all disputes, or all disputes concerning the 
interpretation of the agreement, the statutory discrimination laws must be 
incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement in order to constitute a 
waiver. Neither a general antidiscrimination requirement15 nor contractual 
language that "parallel[s], or even parrot[s]" the discrimination statutes is 
sufficient to establish a waiver in the Fourth Circuit.16 In addition, an 
agreement not to discriminate in violation of the law is not an incorporation 
of the discrimination statutes "in their entirety" into the agreement.17 Courts 
in other jurisdictions have followed the Fourth Circuit cases, and with a few 
exceptions, courts have declined to find waiver of the right to litigate in a 
judicial forum.IS The Wright waiver standard has been applied to state 
discrimination law claimsl9 and constitutional claims as well.20 
14 Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999). Several other 
circuits have concluded either initially, or by reaffirming previously adopted positions, 
that such waivers are impermissible as a matter of law. Rogers v. New York University, 
220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2000); Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, Int 'I, 199 F.3d at 482. 
15 Carson, 175 F.3d at 332. 
16 Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 322 (1999). 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(finding no waiver where collective bargaining agreement does not mention the statute 
and employee's grievance alleging discrimination does not waive right to litigate in 
judicial forum, even where arbitrator and employee discuss the statute); Quint v. A.E. 
Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver when no contractual 
mention of the statute). 
!9 Vasquez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 80 Cal. App. 4th 430, 434 
(2000). 
20 Schumacher v. Souderton Area School Dist., No. CIV.A.99-1515, 2000 WL 
72047 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2000). 
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Two districts courts, one in the Fourth Circuit and one in the Second,21 
have enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory claims based on language in 
collective bargaining agreements. The Middle District of North Carolina, in 
Safrit v. Cone Mills,22 found a waiver based on Carson23 and Brown.24 While 
the language of the agreement is not quoted_ in the case, the court describes 
the language as containing an agreement "not to discriminate against any 
employee because of gender and to abide by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. Section XX of the CBA requires that any grievance against 
Defendant for discrimination must be submitted to arbitration. "25 It is 
difficult to tell from the court's description of the language whether it met 
either of the requirements articulated in, Carson. 
A recent decision from the Eastern District of New York gave preclusive 
effect to an arbitrator's decision to deny a sexual harassment grievance, 
thereby granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Title VII and state law 
claims.26 The court concluded that there was a clear and unmistakable 
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims based on a contractual commitment to 
end sexual harassment, which included a definition drawn in part from 
Supreme Court cases under Title VII, and language in the same provision 
stating that grievances under the clause will be handled with speed and 
confidentiality. 21 
These cases demonstrate that the issue of waivers is alive. and well, 
despite the Supreme Court's lack of a decisio:i;i on the issue of union authority 
or the fact that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, the Second, 
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had refused to 
bar employee lawsuits on the basis of arbitration agreements in collective 
bargaining contracts. 28 · 
21 Since the New York court's decision, however, the Second Circuit has ruled that 
union waivers of employee rights to litigate statutory claims are unenforceable. Rogers v. 
New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2000). 
22 Safrit v. Cone Mills, No. 4:97CV00646, 1999 WL 1111516 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 
1999), appeal docketed, No. 99-2677 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 1999). 
23 Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999) 
24 Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319 (1999). 
25 Safrit, 1999WL1111516, at *1. 
26 See Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
21 [d. 
28 See, e.g., Martin v. Dana Corp., 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1997); Penny v. United 
Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company, 109 F.3d 
- 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Weber Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 
1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming on 
remand, 158 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998), its holding that the employee's failure to 
arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement did not bar her Title VII claim); 
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II. THE AIR LINE PILOTS Ass 'N, INTERNATIONAL DECISION29 
Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International is the only reported case to consider 
the question of whether a union-negotiated waiver of a judicial forum for 
statutory claims is a mandatory subject of bargaining.30 In that case, the 
employer required trainee pilots, who were not represented by the union until 
they completed their training, to agree to various conditions as a part of a 
contract for employment, including a clause that expressly required 
arbitration of statutory claims.31 Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") filed 
suit, alleging that the airline violated the Railway Labor Act by unilaterally 
imposing on the pilots individual contracts concerning mandatory subjects of 
bargaining without first negotiating with the union. 32 The employer, 
disclaiming any intent to apply the individual agreements to contractual 
claims, contended that it had the right to insist on arbitration of statutory 
claims as a condition of employment. 33 
The District Court agreed with ALP A that the arbitration clause was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and enjoined the employer from applying it 
to any employee represented by the union.34 The court, which issued its 
decision prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, concluded that the 
union did not have the authority to waive the individual's right to a judicial 
forum for statutory claims. However, the court disagreed with the employer's 
argument that lack of union authority to agree to a waiver necessarily 
determined that no bargaining with the union was required. The court agreed 
with ALP A that the arbitration agreement was a working condition and 
therefore the employer was required to obtain union consent before executing 
an individual contract with any union-represented employee. Since the 
arbitration provision imposed by the employer governed the rules or 
Varner v. Nat'] Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Long Island 
R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir 1993). 
29 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'] v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 480. 
32 There has been relatively little litigation over the scope of bargaining under the 
Railway Labor Act. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT 205 {Douglas L. Leslie, ed. 1995). 
Although some courts have applied the National Labor Relations Act {NLRA) concepts 
of mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act, there 
has been little judicial development applying the concepts to specific subjects. Id. at 206. 
33 Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, Int'/, 199 F.3d at 481. 
34 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'] v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Civ. Action No. 97-1917, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22739, at *29 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1998). 
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conditions of employment, like the arbitration provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement, it was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the 
District Court.35 After extensively analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions 
relating to arbitration of statutory claims, including Wright, the court agreed 
with the circuits that have concluded that the union cannot waive the 
employee's right to a judicial forum for statutory claims. The court stated the 
following: 
Absent congressional intent to the contrary, a union may not use the 
employees' individual statutory right to a judicial forum as a bargaining 
chip to be exchanged for some benefit to the group; the statutory right "can 
form no part of the collective bargaining process." Applying this rule to the 
facts of the present case, ALP A cotild not lawfully agree to the Arbitration 
Clause because it would effect a waiver of the employees' right to a judicial 
forum for the vindication of their statutory claims of discrimination in 
employment. 36 
Rejecting ALP A's argument that the arbitration of employment claims 
was a mandatory bargaining subject even if the union could not waive the 
employees' right to a judicial forum, the court stated that no subject could be 
mandatory if either party did not have the authority to offer and agree to it. 
Furthermore, the court held that the union could not bargain for the 
procedures to be used in the arbitration as only the individual could 
determine those procedures. 
Since the arbitration clause was not a mandatory subject, the employer 
could lawfully propose it to the individual employees directly, and impose it 
upon them, without violating the statute.37 According to the court, the 
arbitration clause was consistent with the collective bargaining agreement, 
35 Air Line J?ilots Ass'n, Int'/, 199 F.3d at 487. 
36 Id. at 484-85 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974)). 
37 Imposition of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims might be challenged on 
other grounds. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
employees cannot be required as a condition of employment to arbitrate Title VII claims); 
Cole v. Burns Int'] Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that claimants who do not 
''lmowingly'' agree cannot be required to submit Title VII claims to arbitration); EEOC v. 
River Oaks Imaging, No. CN.A.H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995) 
(enjoining application of compulsory arbitration policy at EEOC request when policy was 
implemented after two employees had filed EEOC charges and employees were fired for 
refusing to sign the policy without consulting attorneys); EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration 
of Employment Discrimination Disputes as A Condition of Employment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) 405:7511 (July 7, 1997) (setting forth EEOC opposition to mandatory arbitration). 
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and the employer was not attempting to affect the agreement or to avoid 
dealing with the union. Thus far, the Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International 
court is the only court to deal with the issue. The National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) has not yet considered the question. 
As Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International illustrates, regardless of whether 
the employer seeks to confine statutory claims to the arbitral forum through 
collective bargaining or through individual agreements to arbitrate, in the 
unionized workplace, the determination of whether waiver of the right to a 
judicial forum for statutory claims is a mandatory subject of bargaining is 
crucial. If a subject is mandatory, the employer can insist to the point of 
impasse on its inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement.38 Accordingly, 
a union whose members are not prepared to take economic action to preserve 
their right to litigate statutory discrimination claims might be forced to 
include a waiver in the agreement in order to obtain a collective bargaining 
agreement. If the subject is permissive rather than mandatory, the employer 
can seek such a clause in negotiations but cannot insist that it be a part of any 
agreement.39 Thus a conclusion that the subject is permissive would enable a 
union to resist its inclusion in the agreement without taking economic action 
or trading other benefits to retain the right to litigate. There is another equally 
important consequence of the categorization, however, which is illustrated by 
the Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International case. If the subject is not mandatory, 
the employer may be free to negotiate individually with the employees for 
such a waiver so long as the individual negotiations do not interfere with or 
waive any collectively bargained rights or the employees' section 7 rights to 
organize and bargain collectively.40 A further limitation is that the individual 
negotiations cannot be used to undermine the union.41 
III. BARGAINING UNDER THE NLRA 
The Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International decision provides one court's 
view of the issue in the context of the Railway Labor Act. The court based its 
decision on its conclusion that the union has no authority to waive the 
employees' right to a judicial forum. Were the issue to come before the 
NLRB, however, that determination, at least insofar as it arises from 
interpretation of the statutory discrimination laws, would not be within the 
38 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
39 Id. at 349. 
4o See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39 
(1944). 
41 See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944). 
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jurisdiction of the NLRB.42 At present, with the issue of the legality of such 
waivers unresolved by the Supreme Court, and With a split in the circuits, the 
Board would have to decide the questiori of the stafus of tlie bargaining 
subject without definitive guidance ori the legality of waivers.43 
A. Mandatory Bargaining Subjects Under the NLRA 
Jn determining how the NLRB might approach the issue, 44 analysis 
begins with a review of the statute and the Supreme Court cases regarding 
what constitutes a mandatory subject.45 The statutory description of 
bargaining subjects is quite general. Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)46 make it an 
unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively if the union is the 
representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a).47 
Section 9(a) specifies that representatives chosen by the majority of the 
employees are exclusive repres~ntatives- for -the purposes of bargaining 
collectively with respect to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment .... "48 Section 8(d) defines collective 
bargaining as the obligation to "confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours and other terms and conditions of employment .. : . ;•49 Arbitration of 
42 However, the Board might decide that such a waiver is impermissible under the 
NLRA. See infra notes 143-57, 198. 
43 See United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(finding no violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994), 
where the employer insisted to impasse on inclusion of a proposal to waive the union's 
right to remove from state court to federal court a~ action to enjoin a strike pending 
arbitration, noting that in good faith the company might have believed its proposal to be 
legally enforceable). 
44 While the analysis herein is focused on the NLRA, much of it would apply 
equally under the Railway Labor Act. 
45 Beginning with Justice Harlan's dissent in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S: 342 (1958), there has been' widespread criti~ism of the 
classification of subjects as mandatory or permissive. Id. at 351. As Justice Harlan and 
others have argued, limiting insistence to mandatory subjects resJ;ricts the flexibility of 
the parties and may prevent the evolution of coliective bargaining as the workplace 
develops and changes. For further discussion of this issue, see Archibald Cox & John T. 
Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 
HARV. L. REV. 389, 391-401(1950) (suggesting even before Borg-Warner that the 
NLRA was not intended to give the Board the authority to determine the scope of 
collective bargaining); Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective 
Labor Law, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 791, 806-09 (1998). ! 
46 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1994). 
47 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). 
48/d. 
49 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1994). 
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statutory discrimination claims must fit within the definition of "terms and 
conditions of employment" to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
In addressing the scope of mandatory bargaining in NLRB v. Wooster 
Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,so the Supreme Court considered whether 
bargaining was required over a ballot clause which bound the union to 
submit the employer's final offer to the employees before any strike. The 
Court found that the clause related to the relationship of the union and the 
employees, not of the employer and the employees, and therefore it was not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. Moreover, it weakened the independence of 
the union and enabled the employer to deal directly with the employees 
rather than the union. 
In 1971, the Court rejected the Board's determination that retiree health 
insurance benefits were a mandatory· subject of bargaining.SI With little 
deference to the Board, the Court held that retirees were not members of the 
active workforce and not encompassed within the statutory definition of 
employee. The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Borg-Warner that 
bargaining is required only over subjects that "settle an aspect of the 
relationship between the employer and employees."52 
In Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,53 the Court returned to its deferential 
posture vis-a-vis the Board's decisions regarding bargaining subjects, stating 
"if [the Bo~d's] construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should 
not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the 
statute."54 Without positing a specific test for determining whether a subject 
is mandatory, the Court affirmed the Board's decision, noting that the 
availability and the price of food in the workplace were "plainly germane to 
the 'working environment. "'55 The Court also relied on the industrial practice 
of bargaining about the subject, finding the practice relevant but not 
dispositive. In addition, the Court noted that prior decisions by the Board and 
Courts of Appeal had found other aspects of food service to be negotiable. 
so NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
5! Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 
U.S. 157, 166 (1971). 
52 Id. at 178. In supporting this holding, the Court noted the potential for internal 
conflicts that would arise if retirees were considered a part of the bargaining unit, and 
articulated a fear that the union might favor active employees over retirees. Id. at 173. 
The Court held, relying on prior decisions, that bargaining over ''third party concem[s]" 
may be mandatory, but only if it "vitally affects" the terms and conditions of employment 
of the bargaining unit employees. Id. at 179. Retiree health insurance benefits did not. Id. 
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Food prices are not trivial, nor would bargaining be unduly disruptive.56 
Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the value of bargaining, citing Professor Cox's 
seminal article on the duty to bargain in good faith. 57 
Applying these decisions to the subject at issue here, an agreement to 
arbitrate statutory claims of employees, is the beginning point of the analysis. 
Arbitration of statutory claims involves the relationship of the employer and 
the employees, at least insofar as the statutory claim relates to the employer-
employee relationship. Discrimination cases, which have generated most of 
the litigation challenging arbitration agreements, clearly relate to the 
employer-employee relationship. Nondiscrimination clauses are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining, and employee efforts to eliminate discrimination in 
the workplace have long been considered protected concerted activity.SS 
Other statutory issues such as minimum wage and overtime pay claims under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193859 and claims for leave under the Family 
Medical Leave Act60 similarly relate to the relationship between the 
56 The Court also noted that food prices did not affect the entrepreneurial interest of 
the employer. Id. Further, the Court reaffirmed that the ''vitally affects" test of Allied 
Chemical & Alkali Workers applies only where the matter at issue does not involve the 
relationship of the employer and its employees. Id. at 501. 
57 "Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed position 
either because new facts are brought to light or because the strengths and wealmesses of 
the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes the ·parties hit upon some novel 
compromise of an issue which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained even by 
giving each side a better picture of the strength of the other's convictions. The cost is so 
slight that the potential gains easily justify legal compulsion to engage in the discussion." 
Id. at 502, citing Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
1401, 1412 (1958). 
SS Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Gatliff 
Coal Co. v. NLRB, 953 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming Board decision that two 
employees were unlawfully terminated for the.ir concerted protest against gender-related 
harassment); United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 
1969) (stating that workers have a right to engage in concerted activity to obtain ''racially 
integrated working conditions"); Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 819, 822 
{1994) (finding employees, who after consultation with one another separately 
approached employer about racially discriminatory wages and then went together to file 
separate charges with state anti-discrimination agency, were engaged in protected 
concerted activity); Vought Corp.-MLRS Sys. Div., 273 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1299 {1984) 
(finding employee's discussion of rumor that white employee would be promoted over 
black employee was protected concerted activity); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 
N.L.R.B. 1402, 1405 (1964) (holding that concerted activity of employees to protest 
racially discriminatory hiring practices was protected by§ 8(a)(l)), enforced in relevant 
part, 349 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1965). 
59 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. 2000) 
60 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-19, 2631-36, 2651-54 {1994 & Supp. 2000); 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 6381-87 (1994 & Supp. 2000) 
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employer and employees.61 The industrial practice regarding bargaining over 
arbitration of statutory claims is, at best, unclear. While a few courts have 
found language in collective bargaining agreements sufficient to require 
arbitration of statutory claims, most courts have found either that the 
language does not require arbitration or that the union cannot bind the 
employee to arbitrate such claims. 62 Given this disagreement, it would be 
difficult to reach any conclusion about the practice of bargaining over such 
issues. 
Looking to related issues is somewhat more helpful. The two ways in 
which the courts have found that a union can agree to arbitrate statutory 
claims to the exclusion of litigation are by incorporation of statutory claims 
in the arbitration clause of the agreement, or by incorporation of the statutory 
provisions as a part of the agreement. The Board has long held that 
bargaining over arbitration provisions is required.63 Indeed, arbitration is a 
central feature of national labor policy.64 The Board has construed the statute 
to require bargaining over the structure of the arbitration process, including 
the subjects to be arbitrated or excluded from arbitration,65 the method of 
6I Arbitration of statutory claims does not implicate any entrepreneurial interest of 
the employer. First Nat'I Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 666-67 (1981) 
(''bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued 
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management 
relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the 
conduct of the business."). 
62 Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & 
Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (I Ith Cir. 1997); Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. 
Corp., 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (requiring arbitration of 
statutory claim under collective bargaining agreement), rev'd, 525 U.S. 70 (1998) 
(finding no clear and unequivocal waiver of right to litigate rather than arbitrate); Austin 
v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (requiring 
arbitration of statutory claim under collective bargaining agreement). As noted supra 
notes 18-26 and accompanying text, few courts have found language sufficient to require 
arbitration of statutory claims since Wright. Moreover, it is not clear, even when the 
courts required arbitration, that the parties intended to negotiate language that required 
arbitration of statutory claims and waived the employees' right to litigate. 
63 Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Workers' 
Int'I Union, 28 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 
F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 
1941). 
64 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 
(1960). 
65 Mayes Bros., 145 N.L.R.B. 181, 187 (1963) (finding employer did not violate the 
NLRA by insisting that discipline and discharge be excluded from arbitration). 
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selecting the arbitrator, 66 methods of enforcement of the arbitration award, 67 
and the utilization of a transcript of arbitration proceeqipgs.68 Virtually all 
collective bargaining· agreements contain arbitration provisions.69 
Historically, however, the arbitration provisions at issue involved arbitration 
of contractual rather than statutory disputes. Similarly, the ·Board has long 
held that nondiscrimination provisions are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining,70 and nondiscrimination provisions are commonly included in 
collective bargaining agreements.71 
Arbitration of statutory claims deals directly with the scope of the 
arbitration clause. Prior Board decisions would suggest that bargaining over 
the subjects to be arbitrated is required. Similarly, bargaining over the scope 
of the cont:J;actual prohibition on discrimination seems encompassed by prior 
66 Indep. Stave Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 219, 228 (1980) (finding employer violated Act 
by refusing to comply with the arbitrator selection clause in the agreement, thereby 
violating the duty to bargain). 
67 Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 563, 583 (1967) (finding provision 
that allowed arbitrator to enjoin temporarily a strike or lockout violative of the no 
strike/no lockout clause after ex parte hearing, permitting enforcement of award in state 
court, and waiving right to remove enforcement action to federal court to be a mandatory 
subject of bargaining), review denied sub no~. United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 
150 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
68 Communications Workers of Am., 280 N.L.R.B. 78, 80-81 (1986) (finding union 
violated the Act by unilaterally refusing to agree to preparation, use, and cost-sharing of 
transcripts of arbitration hearings in act:ordance with past practice). 
69 COOPER, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that 99% of collective bargaining agreements 
provide for arbitration of some types of grievances (citing BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION 
CONTRACTS 37 {14th ed. 1995))). 
70 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 273 (1973), ajf'd sub nom. United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Farmers' Coop. 
Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 295 {1968) (finding employer violated section 8(a)(5) by 
failing to bargain meaningfully over elimination of discrimination in the plant), ajf'd sub 
nom. United Packinghouse Workers Int'} Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969). Because virtually all of the cases involving arbitration oflegal claims in the 
collective bargaining context have involved discrimination cases, the focus here is on 
statutory discrimination claims. The analysis is not limited to such claims, however, as 
employers could seek agreements to arbitrate claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
e.g., Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995), the Family Medical Leave Act, other 
federal or state statutes or even common law claims such as tortious discharge in 
violation of public policy. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 
(1988) (finding that§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
(1994), does not preempt state claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy). 
71 N. PETER. LAREAU, DRAFTING THE UNION CONTRACT: A HANDBOOK FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATOR, § SA-10 (1998) ("It has ·been estimated that 94% of all 
collective bargaining agreements contain a non~discnmination clause."). · 
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board decisions that require bargaining over nondiscrimination clauses. This 
simple and straightforward analysis ignores the effect of the provisions at 
issue, however, which is to waive the employee's right to litigate statutory 
discrimination claims. 
B. Waiver as a Non-mandatory Bargaining Subject 
The Board has issued several decisions dealing with classification of 
waivers of various rights as bargaining subjects. In Kolman/Athey Division of 
Athey Products Corp.,12 the Board majority affirmed the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge that the employer violated section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act by insisting to impasse on a contractual provision that waived the 
employee's right to pursue a contractual grievance if the employee filed 
charges with any state or federal agency.73 While the majority expressly 
stated no rationale, it disclaimed reliance on Gardner-Denver14 and found it 
unnecessary to decide whether the proposal was permissive or illegal.75 
Member Stephens' concurrence contained a more extensive rationale.76 He 
relied on cases which held that contract proposals relating to the grievance 
and arbitration procedure were not mandatory subjects of bargaining if they 
would have an adverse effect on the collective bargaining process.77 Member 
Stephens then reasoned that the proposal which required election of remedies 
would have a "severe adverse impact on the Union's ability to engage in 
grievance discussions" and therefore was permissive.78 Since employees 
could preempt the union's processing of a grievance by filing a charge with 
the NLRB or any other government agency, the union's ability to represent 
the employees was severely compromised. 
72 Kolman/Athey Div. of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92 (1991). 
73 Id. at 92. 
74 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974), the Supreme Court 
held that an employee's claim that his discharge violated Title VII could proceed in court 
despite a prior arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement which upheld his 
termination. In Wright, the Court suggested some tension between Gardner-Denver, 
which stated that an employee's Title VII rights could not be waived prospectively, and 
Gilmer, which upheld a prospective waiver of a judicial forum for an ADEA claim, but 
found it unnecessary to decide whether a union's prospective waiver was valid. Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 76-77 (1998). 
75 Kolman/Athey, 303 N.L.R.B. at 92 n.2. 
76 Id. at 92-93. 
77 Id. at 93 (citing Communications Workers of Am., 280 N.L.R.B. 78 (1986), and 
cases cited therein). 
78 Id. 
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While the limited explanation by-the majority provides little gtiidance, 
the more extensive rationale of Member Stephens focusing on the impact of 
the proposal on the collective bargaining process has relevance to waivers of 
the right to litigate statutory clairns.79 The Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
analysis is also helpful. The ALJ concluded that insistence on the waiver of 
the right to litigate in multiple fora was unlawful, distinguishing such 
waivers from waivers of statutory collective rights such as the right to strike 
or the right to bargain during the. term of the collective bargaining 
agreement.SO The authority, cited by the ALJ primarily includes cases where 
the Board found unlawful insistence to impasse on a waiver of employee 
and/or union rights to file unfair labor practice charges or grievances under 
the collective bargaining agreement.81 In discussing the issue, however, the 
ALJ noted that a union attempt to enforce an arbitration award prohibiting 
gender, race, or national origin discrimination could be nullified by an 
employee statutory charge of discrimination filed with an agency. 82 He went 
on to cite Gardner-Denver and to note that the required election ofremedies 
would prevent employees from using different "forums providing different 
remedies in the interests of differing public and private policies and goals for 
the sole reason similar facts give rise to their invocation."83 The statutory 
waiver contemplated herein differs from the election of remedies provision 
discussed by the ALJ in Kolman/Athey only in that it makes the election for 
the employee, rather than making it dependent on the employee's decision to 
file a charge.84 The ALJ's reliance on Gardner-Denver, however, casts some 
doubt ~n the survival of the analysis if Gardner-Denver no longer governs. 85 
79 See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text. 
80 Kolman/Athey, 303 N.L.R.B. at 96. 
81 Id. 
82Id. 
83 Id. 
84 It might also be argued that the waiver of a judicial forum does not preclude the 
employee from filing an EEOC charge, but only from initiating a lawsuit. See Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 
805 (4th Cir. 1999) (permitting EEOC to proceed with lawsuit despite arbitration 
agreement because EEOC is vindicating the public interest in eradicating discrimination, 
but precluding EEOC from seeking relief for individual in the lawsuit). Given the smaII 
percentage of cases litigated by the EEOC, however, and the judicial decisions precluding 
individual relief in EEOC cases where the employee agreed to arbitration, this distinction 
makes little difference: 
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In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,86 the Board directly addressed the issue of 
whether a waiver of the employee's right to seek redress from the Board for 
discipline related to violation of a no strike clause was a mandatory subject 
of bargaining. 87 The Board found insistence to impasse on such a waiver to 
be contrary to the policy of the statute and unrelated to terms and conditions 
of employment.88 Accordingly, without finding whether the waiver was a 
permissive or illegal subject, the Board concluded that bargaining was not 
mandatory.89 In so holding, the Board cited the importance of unimpeded 
access to the agency, relying on both Supreme Court and NLRB cases that 
find union constitutional provisions that limit Board access unlawfuJ.90 With 
less analysis, the Board found that, unlike a no-strike clause, the waiver did 
not regulate relations between the employer and employees or settle a term or 
condition of employment.91 
Fiscal Year (FY) No. of Charees No. of Lawsuits 
1995 87,529 373 
1996 77,990 193 
1997 80,680 338 
1998 79,591 405 
1999 77,444 465 
THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 
1992 THROUGH FY 2000, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last 
modified Jan. 18, 2001). · 
8S While Gardner-Denver is still good law, the Court in Wright suggested that some 
tension exists between Gardner-Denver and the later Gilmer decision. Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 76-77 (1998). Were the Court to decide 
that a union-negotiated waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims was enforceable, 
Gardner-Denver would likely be overruled or at least limited. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 80 
(suggesting that Gardner-Denver contains a "seemingly absolute prohibition of union 
waiver of employees' federal forum rights."). 
86 Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69 (1988), enforced in relevant part, 906 
F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
87 Id. at 72. 
88 Id. at 71. 
89 Id. at 72. 
90 Id. at 71-72 (citing NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of 
Am., Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968); Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 138, 
148 N.L.R.B. 679, 684 (1964) (finding union violated the NLRA by fining union member 
for filing NLRB charges without first exhausting internal remedies); Int'! Ass'n of 
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 277 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1072 (1985) (finding 
union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by disciplining union official who filed NLRB charges, 
even where union was pursuing legitimate union interests, because discipline interfered 
with access to the Board). 
9l Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. at 72; see also Bryant & Stratton Bus. 
Inst., 327 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1999) (holding that demand that union waive its right to file 
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Perhaps closer in fact to_ the waiyer of judicial forum a.t issue here is 
Borden, Inc. 92 In Borden, the ei:µployer, negotiating over the effects of a 
plant closing, insisted 'that employee.s, who elected severan:ce pay, sign a 
general release of . "Claim8 for wages, employment, reemployment, 
reinstatement, and 'any and all causes of action whatsoever' whjch an 
employee might have against Respondent as a result of his employment."93 
The union indicated a willingness to agr~e to a release limited to contractual 
rights and rights relating· to termination of employment, but expressed 
particular concern over reieasmg rights to file health and safety claims 
relating to exposure to a carcinogenic substance used in the workplace.94 The 
Board adopted the ALJ's finding that a general release is not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. The ALJ dete.rntlned that.the classification of a waiver 
of a future legal right was dependent on the nature of the right extinguished 
by the waiver. He concluded that a general release of all future claims arising 
out of previous employment "is too attenuated· from the actual terms and 
conditions of that employment to be a mandatory subject ofbargairiing."95 
The Board has also held that the issue of whether tQ maintain a lawsuit or 
unfair labor practice charge, or to settle. such a charge, is not a mandatory 
subject ofbargaining.96 Accordingly, insistence on an agreement not to file, 
or to settle, violates the duty to bargain in good faith.97 
unfair labor practice charges as a condition of granting a wage increase was a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining). 
92 Borden, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 396 (1986). 
93 Id. at 398. 
94Id. 
95 Id. at 399 n.5. 
96 See, e.g., Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst., 327 N.L.R.B. at 1135; Laredo Packing Co., 
254 N.L.R.B. 1 (1981) (finding settlement of dispute over back pay liability and 
withdrawal of breach of contract lawsuit and unfair labor practice charges to be non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining); Peerless Food Products, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 530, 534 
(1977) (finding unlawful an employer's conditionjng of agreement upon withdrawal of 
lawsuit that sought contributions to pension trust)~ Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 
F.2d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that conditioning bargaining on withdrawal of 
unfair labor practice charge violates section 8(a)(5)); NLRB v. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters, 447 F.2d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that UI)ion insistence that 
contractors' association drop litigation over trust fund management as a condition of 
bargaining violated section 8(b )(3) as subject non-mandatory). 
97 See supra note 96. 
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C. Application of the Law to Forum Waivers 
The analysis in Borden98 and the other cases holding that settlement or 
maintenance of lawsuits or unfair labor practice charges is a non-mandatory 
subject supports an argument that waiver of a judicial forum is also a non-
mandatory subject. Like the general release that incorporates waivers of 
health and safety claims, it may be too attenuated from terms and conditions 
of employment to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. Yet it relates 
to nondiscrimination obligations and the forum in which they will be 
litigated, subjects that seem intimately related to terms and conditions of 
employment. Only if statutory rights are viewed as distinct from terms and 
conditions of employment does the rationale make sense. Borden does 
suggest that the nature of the right extinguished by the waiver determines 
whether the subject is mandatory. Waivers of the right to strike and the right 
to bargain have been held to be mandatory subjects.99 Waivers of the right to 
file or maintain unfair labor practice charges or lawsuits are not. Although 
the cases cited above involve unfair labor practice charges or lawsuits 
directly related to the collective bargaining agreement or protected union 
activity, such as breach of contract claims or suits relating to employee 
benefit trust funds, the rationale may be even stronger for lawsuits involving 
individual employee rights.too 
While the rationale for finding settlement or withdrawal of lawsuits or 
charges to be non-mandatory subjects is not clearly articulated in many 
cases, the argument of an attenuated relationship to terms and conditions of 
employment is not particularly persuasive. The lawsuits and unfair labor 
practice charges at issue in many of the Board's cases related directly to 
terms and conditions of employment, although not perhaps to negotiation of 
those terms. Better rationales for finding waivers and settlements to be non-
mandatory are the need to preserve access to the Board and the courts, and 
the reluctance to allow employers or unions to condition access to statutory 
rights, such as the right to bargain, on waiver of other rights, such as the right 
to litigate under statutes designed to protect the public interest. For the same 
98 Borden, 279 N.L.R.B. at 396. 
99 NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952) (finding no per se 
violation where the employer bargained for a management functions clause that gave 
unilateral control to the employer over matters such as promotion and discipline); In re 
Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1350 (1948) (finding no bad faith bargaining where 
parties reached impasse on no strike clause). It has been argued, however, that 
interpreting the Act to permit such waivers weakens the statutory protection for workers. 
See generally Peter Phillips, The Contractual Waiver of Individual Rights Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 793 (1986). 
100 See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. 
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reason that unions cannot penalize members for exercising their right to file 
charges with the NLRB, employers should not be permitted to condition 
collective bargaining on the union's agreemen~ to waive employees' rights to 
file lawsuits to vindicate their statutory rights. If a union or an employer 
cannot be forced to settle, drop, or prospectively waive litigation over a 
benefits trust or breach of a collective bargaining agreem~nt in order to 
obtain a collective bargaining agreement (and thereby labor peace), then that 
same entity cannot be forced to sacrifice employee rights, particularly where 
such rights are infused with the public interest. Since there may be a greater 
willingness to sacrifice rights that do not belong to the union in the first 
place, the Board should be more vigilant tp insure that the waiver is not used 
as a club in collective bargaining. · 
If the Board were to find that waivers of individual employee rights were 
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the employer cquld condition bargaining 
over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment on employee 
waivers of their right to enforce various employee protective ·statutes. IOI An 
IOI This assumes, of course, that such ~aivers are p~ssible under the statute or 
common law giving rise to the right. Forcing an employee to sacrifice the right to litigate 
in order to obtain a collective bargaining agreement is analogous to forcing an employee 
to give up a statutory right to retain employment. Courts in many states have found it 
violative of public policy to terminate employees for asserting statutory rights, even 
where the statutes have no retaliation protection. E.g., Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 665 
A.2d 833, 834-35 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding wrongful discharge where employee was 
terminated for seeking unemployment benefits because public policy clearly provi~ed for 
such benefits); Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P. 2d 752, 754 (Wyo. 
1989) (finding employees could bring retaliatory discharge action when terminated for 
filing workers' compensation claims); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 
652 (Kan. 1988) (extending to employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
the right to bring retaliatory discharge action based on filing for workers' compensation 
benefits, based on public policy in the Workers' Compensation Act); Harless v. First 
Nat'I Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (finding employee could file 
claim for wrongful discharge based on retaliation for attempting to force employer to 
comply with state and federal statutes protecting credit consumers). The rationale for 
these cases is that if the employee has a statutory right, termination of the employee for 
asserting that right is against public policy. The Supreme Court's decision in Livadas v. 
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994), further supports the conclusion that the waiver is not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court there found state law preempted when it 
penalized employees who exercised their statutory right to bargaining collectively by 
exempting them from the state law. Id. at 135. The Court stated: "A state rule predicating 
benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law poses special dangers 
of interference with congressional purpose." Id. at 116. So too does an employer 
requirement that the exercise of collective bargaining rights be conditioned on waiver of 
judicial litigation of other statutory claims. See also Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm., 389 
U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (preempting Florida law disqualifying employee from receiving 
unemployment compensation benefits because she filed unfair labor practice charge, 
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employer could obtain a waiver of employee rights to file workers' 
compensation claims, enforce health and safety statutes, enforce pension 
rights under ERISA, litigate claims of retaliatory discharge for reporting 
statutory violations, 102 and so on. If unions resisted employer attempts to 
obtain waivers, it would frustrate the primary goal of the statute-
encouraging collective bargaining to promote labor peace. While courts and 
other enforcement agencies might find such waivers ineffective under the 
statute being enforced, the chilling effect of the waiver might preclude many 
claims from ever reaching the enforcement agency. Moreover, the lack of 
certainty about the validity of the waiver would lead to union resistance and 
thereby interfere with the goal of peaceful settlement of labor disputes. 
The Board has a long history of regulation designed to preserve the 
process of collective bargaining because of its centrality to the statutory 
purpose. Thus, although the Board is generally precluded from regulating 
economic weapons in order to balance bargaining power because it intrudes 
on the bargaining process, 103 the Board may do so where the conduct 
frustrates or substantially interferes with the bargaining process.104 Recently, 
the Board crafted an exception to the policy that unilateral implementation of 
contract proposals is permissible once the parties have bargained to 
impasse.105 The Board's rationale, approved by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, was that the merit pay proposal at issue 
would adversely impact the collective bargaining process.106 Because the 
proposal gave the employer standardless discretion, it would detrimentally 
affect future negotiations by ensuring that the union could not bargain 
analogizing state action to coercive employer actions which frustrate Congressional 
purpose ofleaving employees free to file charges). 
102 While in many cases prospective waivers of the right to file claims implicate the 
public interest, wrongful discharge claims in which the employee is terminated for 
reporting unlawful or dangerous employer conduct pose particular risk, for employees 
will be dissuaded from reporting conduct that may harm the public, and individuals other 
than employees may be unaware of such conduct. E.g., Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 
P.2d 1046, 1056 (Cal. 1998) (citing public policy favoring air line safety in upholding 
reversal of summary judgment in favor of employer that terminated employee for 
objecting to shipping of defective parts to airline manufacturers); Norris v. Hawaiian 
Airlines, Inc., 74 Haw. 235, 842 P.2d 634, 644--45 (Haw. 1992) (upholding employee's 
wrongful discharge claim where he was fired for reporting discrepancies in airline's 
maintenance records). 
103 NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'! Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496 (1960). 
104 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962); Charles D. Bonanno Linen 
Service v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 419 (1982). 
105 See McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1996), enforced, 131 F.2d 
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
106 Id. at 1388. 
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-lmowledgeably over wages, an issue central to the collective bargaining 
process.107 Similarly here, the conclusion that the waiver is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining would detrimentally affect the process of collective 
bargaining by making it dependent upon an agreement to waive the statutory 
rights of individual employees. Bargaining rights could be held hostage to 
obtain agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, entangling the statutorily-
mandated bargaining process with employer efforts to minimize litigation 
costs and perhaps with enforcement efforts relating to other employment 
statutes.108 , 
Moreover, as noted by Member Stephens, those contract proposals 
relating to the grievance and arbitration procedure that would adversely 
impact the collective bargaining process are not mandatory.109 Forcing all 
statutory claims into the arbitration process may adversely affect the union's 
ability to process and handle grievances due to the increased volume of 
cases. In addition for reasons set forth more fully below, mandatory 
arbitration of statutory claims will impact arbitration of contractual claims 
due to the frequent overlap of the claims.110 Thus, for this reason also, the 
waiver should be a non-mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The Supreme ~ourt has evinced a concern with allowing a union to 
waive employee rights where the union's interests may conflict with that of 
the employees. In NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,111 the Supreme Court noted that 
the ability of the union to waive employee rights such as the right to strike, 
was premised on fair representation by the unioJ?. and on the employee's right 
to choose his or her bargaining representative freely.112 In Magnavox, the 
Supreme Court held that the union could not lawfully waive the right to 
distribute literature on company premises because of the interference with 
employee rights, which might conflict with the union's self interest in 
preventing employees supportive of oth~r unions from distributing 
literature.113 Even where no conflict is apparent, the Board should not find 
the subject mandatory because the union may be less vigilant about 
107 Id. at 1390-91. 
108 For a discussion of the way in which employers might utilize arbitration 
agreements to contract out of their statutory nondiscrimination obligations, see Malin, 
supra note 2, at 601-22. 
109 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 186-215 and accompanying text. 
111 NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974). 
112 Id. at 324. 
113 Id. For discussion of possible conflictS between union and employee interests, 
see Hodges, supra note 3, at 143-45; Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination Labor 
and Employment Arbitration and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual 
Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORYL. J. 135, 201 (2000). 
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protecting the employee right, and quick to waive such a right to obtain 
benefits for the members of the bargaining unit.114 Union resistance may be 
particularly difficult where there is strong employee pressure to obtain an 
agreement with immediate benefits, such as wage increases and pension and 
insurance benefits. While the waiver may adversely affect bargaining unit 
members eventually, the employees are not likely to value highly the right to 
litigate at the time of negotiations.115 Thus, the importance of finding such a 
waiver non-mandatory rivals that of a settlement of unfair labor practice 
charges or a lawsuit filed by the union, a subject in which the union may see 
a much more direct interest. 
It might be argued that the waiver at issue here is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining because the only waiver is of the forum, rather than the claim. 
The claim can still be litigated, albeit in the arbitral rather than the judicial 
forum. The Board in Kolman/Athey, however, found the waiver of the forum 
only to be non-mandatory.116 A further difficulty with this argument is that, 
while assuming arguendo that individual arbitration is a mere substitution of 
a different forum, arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is 
not.117 Under a collective bargaining agreement, the union, not the employee, 
controls the decision about whether to arbitrate and how to arbitrate, 
including who serves as arbitrator, what arguments to make, and who 
represents the union in the arbitration.118 Indeed the agreement to waive a 
judicial forum may result in an employee's discrimination claim receiving no 
hearing at all, despite the desires of the employee.119 In fact then, the waiver 
is more substantive than a mere forum waiver. Even assuming the union can 
lawfully waive the right, the employer should not be able to force such a 
waiver by conditioning collective bargaining on it. 
In the latter sense, the waiver is analogous to settlement as a bargaining 
subject. The union (or the employer) can lawfully drop or settle an unfair 
labor practice or lawsuit, and indeed our legal system encourages settlement. 
114 For reasons set forth in my earlier work, unions should be reluctant to agree to 
such a waiver. See Hodges, supra note 3, at 157-59. Nevertheless, employees may be 
unwilling to strike over the issue because of the lack of immediate relevance as 
contrasted with wages, thereby pressuring the union to agree to a waiver. Id. at 162. 
115 Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine 
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 29 (1996). 
116 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. 
117 For a thorough discussion of the reasons, see Hodges, supra note 3, at 154-55. 
l l8 See id. at 145-50. 
119 E.g., Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 978, 983 (W.D.N.C. 1997) 
(finding litigation of the employee's disability discrimination claim precluded by an 
arbitration agreement even though union in arbitration never raised the issue of disability 
discrimination). 
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Nevertheless, collective bargaining cannot be conditioned on settlement or 
withdrawal of a charge or lawsuit. Ito Nor should it be conditioned on 
agreement to waive the employees' statutory right to a judicial forum. 
An additional argument that a wai.ver of the right to a judicial forum is 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining posits that agreement to such a waiver 
would violate the union's duty of fair representation. In Southwestern 
Pipe, 121 the Board held th~t it was unlawful for an employer to insist that an 
agreement include a nondiscrimination.clause that would require the union to 
breach its duty of fair representation.122 The Board adopted the Trial 
Examiner's decision, which found that the provision insisted upon by the 
employer would prevent the union from grieving on behalf of an African-
American employee who received a lower rate of pay for doing the same 
work as a white employee despite eq~l seniority, skill, and productivity. The 
Trial Examiner concluded that agreement to such a provision would breach 
the union's duty of fair representation and subject it to liability under Title 
VII. Although the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement, the basis for the denial 
was not the principle upon which the Board relied, but rather the conclusion 
that the language proffered by the employer should not be interpreted to 
preclude the union from challenging employer discrimination.123 Following 
Southwestern Pipe, it might be argued that insistence by the employer on a 
waiver violates section 8(a)(5) by requiring the union to agree to breach its 
duty of fair representation. 
That argument, however, presupposes that agreement to a waiver 
breaches the duty of fair representation. If the Supreme Court ultimately 
concludes that such a waiver is impermissible, then it seems clear that 
insistence on a union waiver would be a non-mandatory subject, based on 
this rationale among others. However, if such a waiver is permissible under 
discrimination law, as the Fourth Circuit has currently held, then it is difficult 
to conclude that the mere agreement to a waiver would violate the duty of 
fair representation. Were other circum8tances present, such as evidence that 
the union's agreement was motivated by a desire to limit the rights of a 
120 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
121 Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 364 (1969), enforcement denied in 
relevant part, 44 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1971). 
122 Id. at 376. As noted supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text, the Supreme 
Court in NLRB v. Magnavox, Co., 415 U.S. 322, 324 (1974), found that a permissible 
waiver is premised on fair representation. Where the premise is missing, the waiver 
should be impermissible. 
123 The Board subsequently reaffirmed the principle in Graphic Arts Int 'l Union, 
Local 280, 235 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1084 (1978). 
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disfavored group, a breach of the duty would likely be found.124 But in such 
a situation, the case facing the Board would be an allegation of a section 
8(b)(l)(A) violation, not a complaint of employer insistence on a non-
mandatory subject.125 
One might also argue that a union breaches its duty of fair representation 
by agreeing to limit judicial rights knowing that the union does not have the 
resources to represent employees with statutory claims effectively in the 
grievance procedure. Such an . action may not be discriminatory, absent 
specific discriminatory intent, for it affects all employees in the bargaining 
unit who have potential claims, but might be arbitrary or in bad faith.126 
Again, however, the focus is on fair representation, not the status of the 
l24 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (finding that the statutory duty of fair 
representation that originated in a line of cases focusing on racial discrimination requires 
that "the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated 
unit includes a statutory obligation to serve interests of all members without hostility or 
discrimination."); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 201 (1944) (holding that 
where a statute provides for a representative to be chosen by a class of employees, that 
representative is under a duty to represent all members of the class equally regardless of 
race); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B. 
312, 317 (1964) (finding violation of section 8(b)(l)(A) where union refused to process 
grievances of African-American workers because of race and finding reliance on racially 
discriminatory contract terms no defense); Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1367, 148 
NLRB 897, 897-98 (1964) (finding "that (1) by maintaining and enforcing the 75-25 
percent work distribution between Locals 1367 and 1368, respectively, based upon race 
and union membership, in successive collective-bargaining agreements ... Respondents 
have failed to comply with their· duty as exclusive bargaining representative to represent 
all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and impartially, and thereby violated section 
8(b)(l)(A) of the Act."); Indep. Metal Workers Union, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574 
(1964) (finding that union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by refusing to process grievance 
based on the grievant's race and stating that although issue of validity of racially 
discriminatory contract terms was not raised by the complaint, majority did not disagree 
with the charging party that negotiation of such terms by union violates section 
8(b)(l)(A)). 
125 If evidence of the union's discriminatory motive were available, it might be used 
to defeat an employer's motion for dismissal of a judicial claim on the basis of the 
arbitration agreement. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(refusing to compel employee to arbitrate when agreement was so egregiously unfair as 
to breach the company's duty to establish fair arbitration rules under the agreement); 
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding arbitration agreement only 
when certain requirements were met, and noting that an employee could not be compelled 
to arbitrate a statutory claim under an agreement that was a condition of employment 
when the employee was required to pay any of the costs of arbitration). A requirement 
that the employee utilize an arbitration procedure with representation hostile to the 
employee's interests would seem to be equally unfair. 
l26 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (setting forth this 
standard for duty of fair representation cases). 
536 
IS BARGAINING WITH THE UNION REQUIRED 
bargaining subject. Taking the argument a step further, an employer that 
insists on waiver of a judicial fonun for statutory claims· may violate section 
8(a)(5) if it knows that the union cannot effectively handle the ·statutory 
claims in the grievance procedure.127 Such ari argument makes the 
classification of the bargaining subject t4m on,the employer's knowledge or 
motivation. Setting aside the difficulties of proof, 128. the classification of 
bargaining subjects has not traditionally. tµrned on motivation. Rather, 
motivation has been an element of good faith bargaining. Thus, on~ could 
argue that insistence on such an agreement does not .viola,te section 8(a)(5) 
because it is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, but rather because the 
employer is bargaining in bad faith by insisting on a proposal that is legal, 
but predictably unacceptable since it · effectively eliminates employee 
statutory rights and, therefore, causes the union to breach its duty of fair 
representation.129 However, the Board is traditionally reluctant to find 
surface bargaining based on the employer's position on one issue if the 
employer appears to be bargaining in good faith on other subjc::cts.130 If it 
appears, in a given case, that the employer is using the waiver to frustrate 
. . ~ . 
127 Cf. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(holding employer may be joined in duty of fair representation claim if employer has 
knowledge of union's breach). 
128 The union might submit proof of the number of discrimination complaints and 
the limits on its resources, but it is not clear whether that would be sufficient evidence or 
whether employer knowledge of those facts and motivation could be established. In 
addition, a union would likely be reluctant to argue ftirther its own ineffectiveness, even 
if the benefits were greater than appears here. 
129 See, e.g., Josten Concrete Prods. Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1032 (1989) (finding 
"unpalatable" wage proposal and proposal for waiver of statutory rights designed to 
frustrate bargaining); E. Tex. Steel Castings Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081-82 (1965) 
(finding employer proposals on management rights and limited arbitration so predictably 
unacceptable that requisite intent to reach agreement absent). 
· 130 E.g., John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L:R.B. 394, 395 (1959), enforced in part and 
denied in part, 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 19.60); The Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., -160 
N.L.R.B. 334, 341 (1966). Moreover, effectively remedying such a violation is 
notoriously difficult. See H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Andrew Strom, 
Rethinking the NLRB's Approach to Union Recognition Agreements, 15 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB L. 50, 56 (1994) (relating H.K. Porter's limitations on bargaining remedies 
to the lack of meaningful remedies for employer refusals to recognize and bargain with 
unions selected by a majorify of their employees); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-
NLRB Remedial Power to Impose Contract Tei-ms, 84 HARV.· L. REV. 202 (1970) 
(discussing limits on the remedial powers of the Board); Note, NLRB Power to Award 
Damages in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1688-93 (1971) 
(distinguishing between remedies that award damages and the.i:emedial impo~ition of 
contract terms). 
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bargaining, the Board might find a violation without determining that the 
waiver is not a mandatory subject ofbargaining.131 
Although the above analysis concludes that the waiver is not a 
mandatory bargaining subject, all other aspects of arbitration of statutory 
claims come within the definition of mandatory bargaining subjects. Thus the 
employer and union must bargain, upon request, about the scope of the 
grievance and arbitration procedures and the process by which statutory 
grievances are arbitrated, if they are included in any arbitration procedure. In 
addition, the employer and union must bargain, upon request, about the 
existence and scope of a nondiscrimination clause. 
The practical result of this conclusion is that the employer and union may 
bargain, and insist to the point of impasse, on all aspects of arbitration and 
nondiscrimination clauses except for language that waives the employees' 
right to litigate claims. Accordingly, neither can insist to the point of impasse 
that the arbitration procedure expressly cover statutory claims or that any 
nondiscrimination law be expressly incorporated into the agreement.132 An 
express waiver of the right to litigate such claims would be similarly off 
limits. 
A conclusion that waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims is not a 
mandatory bargaining subject does not preclude the employer and the union 
from agreeing to such a waiver, nor does it prohibit the union and employer 
from soliciting employee waivers should they decide to provide for 
arbitration of statutory claims.133 It merely prevents either party from 
insisting to the point of impasse that such a provision be included in the 
collective bargaining agreement. As many commentators have suggested, 
arbitration may be an appropriate forum for litigation of some or all statutory 
claims.134 The presence of the union may eliminate some of the identified 
drawbacks of individual arbitration of statutory claims.135 The experienced 
131 H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1372 (1965), enforced, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966) (finding employer's intransigent position on dues checkoff clause violated 
duty to bargain in good faith because it was a "device to frustrate agreement.") 
132 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
l33 Of course, the union could agree only if a union waiver was legally permissible. 
Currently, such waivers are permissible in at least the Fourth Circuit. 
134 See BALES, supra note 6, at 9-10; Turner, supra note 113, at 202; Lewis L. 
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 29, 29-30, 63 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To 
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); Roberto L. 
Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1066-70 {1996); R. Theodore Clark, Jr., A Management View of 
Nonunion Employee Arbitration Procedures, in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 176-
77 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita, eds. 1997). 
135 See Hodges, supra note 3, at 168-69. 
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union can assist employees with arbitration, provide information to 
employees that will help prove the claim, and balance the power of the 
employer as a repeat player in the arbitration process.136 However, it should 
be the choice of the union and the employees it represents, rather than of the 
employer alone, whether and how to incorporate statutory claims in the 
collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration procedure. Furthermore, 
unions, employees, and employers could agree to a voluntary procedure to 
arbitrate statutory claims either before or after they arise, 137 utilizing either 
the collectively bargained procedure or a separate arbitration procedure. To 
the extent that there are benefits from arbitrating statutory claims, they will 
be arbitrated voluntarily and a Board decision that prevents insistence on a 
waiver will not preclude arbitration. 
N. UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED WAIVERS 
Despite the arguments above, the Board or the courts may determine that 
a provision for mandatory and .exclusive arbitration of statutory claims 
relates to the scope of the arbitration procedure and thus constitutes a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. While in most cases, classification of a 
subject as mandatory carries with it the right to implement unilaterally when 
bargaining impasse is reached, there are exceptions. For several reasons, the 
employer could not implement a proposal to arbitrate statutory claims over 
the union's objection. First, because arbitration requires consent, it cannot be 
unilaterally imposed at impasse.138 Second, where, as here, a proposed 
provision constitutes a waiver, it cannot be imposed unilaterally, for a waiver 
requires consent as well.139 Like the right to strike, the right to litigate cannot 
136 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out Ahead in Alternative Judicial 
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO Sr. J. DISP. REsoL. 19, 41 (1999); Lisa B. 
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial 
Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 242 (1998); Lisa 
B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: Differences between Repeat Player and Nonrepeat 
Player Outcomes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUS. 
RELATIONSREsEARCHASS'N201, 202, 207 (1997). 
137 Voluntary post-dispute arbitration of individual statutory claims does not 
sufficiently implicate mandatory subjects of bargaining to require union participation in 
negotiation of such agreements. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
138 See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1991); 
McClatchy Newspapers v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997); NLRB v. 
McClatchy Newspapers, 964 F.2d 1153, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
139 See McClatchy Newspapers, 131 F.3d at 1031 (indicating that an employer could 
not impose a no-strike provision because the strike is a fundamental right which requires 
a specific contractual waiver). -
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be waived by the union except by a clear and unequivocal waiver.140 Thus, 
even if deemed a mandatory bargaining subject, the waiver cannot be 
accomplished by unilateral imposition of a contract provision after impasse. 
The inability of the employer to implement an exclusive statutory 
arbitration system after impasse does not, however, eliminate the adverse 
impact on the bargaining process that would be caused by finding a waiver to 
be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although implementation would be 
prohibited, the employer could still insist to impasse that such a waiver be 
included in any contract, and the union would be forced to agree, take 
economic action, or continue without any agreement. The employees would 
still be deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement unless 
they waived their right to litigate statutory claims. While the waiver could 
not be unilaterally imposed, the employees would either have to live with no 
agreement or strike. Thus, the collective bargaining process and labor peace 
would still be frustrated by the injection of the statutory waiver into 
negotiations. 
V. BARGAINING FOR INDIVIDUAL WAIVERS 
In the ALPA case, the court of appeals, after concluding that arbitration 
of statutory claims was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, upheld the 
employer's right to impose arbitration on individual employees.141 The 
district court, however, found the subject mandatory and prohibited employer 
imposition of the arbitration requirement. Regardless of the classification of 
waivers as a bargaining subject, the question of whether the National Labor 
Relations Act permits the employer to bypass the union and impose waivers 
on the employees that the union represents must be answered. While the 
EEOC has taken the position that such agreements are inconsistent with 
discrimination laws, 142 many courts have upheld them, 143 and the NLRB has 
not directly ruled on the question. 
140 See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998). 
141 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, 199 F.3d 477, 485-86 (1999). 
142 The EEOC opposes imposition of such waivers as a condition of employment. 
EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging, No. CIV.A.H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
19, 1995); EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a 
Condition of Employment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7511 (July 7, 1997) (setting forth 
EEOC opposition to mandatory arbitration). The EEOC has participated as amicus in 
cases raising the issue, arguing that employees cannot be compelled to enter into 
predispute arbitration agreements. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 937 
(4th Cir. 1999). 
143 E.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (I Ith Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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A. The NLRB General Counsel's Position on C<?mpulsory Arbitration 
In 1995, the NLRB General Counsel; in response to a request for advice 
from an NLRB Regional Director; took the position that mandatory 
arbitration agreements in the nonunion context violate the Act.144 The issue 
submitted for advice in Bentley's Luggage Corp. was whether the employer 
violated the statute by requiring employees to agree to arbitrate employment 
claims before· seeking redress in any other forum, and by firing the charging 
party for refusal to sign the agreement.145 Since the employees in Bentley's 
were not represented by ,a union, the issue addressed was not whether the 
agreement was a mandatory subject of bargaining, but rather whether it could 
be lawfully imposed on nonunion employees under threat of termination.146 
The General Counsel authorized a complaint, absent settlement, alleging that 
the action violated sections 8(a)(l) and (4) because it required the employees 
to waive their statutory right to file charges with. the Board. The 
memorandum relied upon the early Supreme Court decision in National 
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 147 holding that contracts used to frµstrate statutory 
rights are unlawful. 148 The memorandum went on to note that the Board has 
subsequently held that employers and unions violate the Act by insisting that 
employees waive either their right to file unfair labor practice charges or 
their right to use contractual grievance and arbitration procedures.149 
Although the arbitration agreement at issue could be broadly read to waive 
the right to pursue any statutory claim without first arbitrating, the focus of 
the General Counsel was on the waiver of the right to bring charges to the 
NLRB. Thus, the General Counsel asserted a violation of section 8(a)(4), 
which prohibits discrimination against employees for filing charges or giving 
testimony under the Act.150 The General Counsel reasoned that the provision 
I44 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice 
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) ~ 34208, at 212 (Aug. 21, 1995), available' at 1995 N.L.R.B. 
GCM LEXIS 92 (1995). 
145 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *l. 
146 Id. 
147 Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940). 
148 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997. Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice 
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *6-7. 
149 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *7-8 (citing, inter alia, 
Kolman/Athey Div. of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92 (1991) and Vazquez, 265 
N.L.R.B. 602 (1982)). 
150 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 
N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM 
LEXIS 92, at *9. . . . 
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was enacted to protect employee rights to report unfair labor practices and 
the arbitration agreement interfered with that purpose.151 
The employer argued that the Gilmer casel52 privileged the agreement, 
but the General Counsel found the case inapplicable.153 First, Gilmer permits 
enforceable arbitration agreements for statutory claims only where the statute 
does not evidence an intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies.154 The 
General Counsel read the Act as giving enforcement authority to the Board 
regardless of other remedies available.155 Further, the General Counsel noted 
that the EEOC could pursue an age discrimination claim (the subject of the 
waiver in Gilmer) without the filing of a charge by the employee, but the 
Board has no such authority.156 Thus a waiver by the employee precludes 
enforcement of the statute.157 While the rationale in Bentley's supports a 
conclusion that insistence on a waiver of the right to file NLRB charges 
would violate the Act, the General Counsel's specific reliance on the 
National Labor Relations Act provides little guidance with respect to waivers 
of other statutory claims.158 
Arguably, the Board should not be concerned with waiver of a judicial 
forum for claims under other statutes by either union or nonunion employees. 
Instead, determination of the legality of such waivers should be left to the 
151 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice 
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *9-10. 
152 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
153 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice 
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *11. 
154 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice 
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213-14, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at 
*13 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29). 
155 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice 
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 214, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *13. 
The General Counsel also noted that Gilmer involved enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement already signed, not whether an effort to obtain such an agreement was lawful. 
Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *14. 
156 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *14. 
157 The Memorandum also noted that since employees were at-will, the arbitration 
agreement did not clearly provide a basis to challenge a termination proscribed by the 
statute. Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *15. In addition, the General 
Counsel rejected the employer's claim that the agreement did not bar unfair labor practice 
charges, noting that the right to file charges after arbitration was illusory, given the six-
month statute of limitations and the requirement that employees not only refrain from 
initiating actions, but dismiss actions already commenced. Id., available at 1995 
N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *15-18. 
158 Of course, the Advice Memorandum is not a decision of the Board and thus does 
not have the force of Jaw in any event. The Bentley's case settled prior to litigation. 
Bentley's Luggage Corp., 96 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA} 15 (May 17, 1996). 
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enforcement agencies and courts interpreting those statutes. Further, as noted 
by the General Counsel, with respect to at least the discrimination statutes the 
consequences of such a waiver are different, since the NLRB can act only 
after filing of a charge, while the EEOC can initiate its own charges.159 
Accordingly, the waiver would not completely preclude statutory 
enforcement in the discrimination context. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the 
EEOC rarely files suit and there are perils to acting without evidence from a 
charging party or parties.160 An additional difference is that the EEPC may 
be able to litigate a claim after filing of a charge, even if the employee who 
filed the charge is precluded from litigating in the judicial forum.161 Since 
the individual has no right to litigate under the NLRA under any 
circumstance, if an arbitration agreement did not preclude the filing of a 
charge or litigation by the agency, then it would have no effect.162 
159 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994) (''The Secretary may 
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the unpaid 
minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated 
damages."); Procedure for the Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.11 (2000) (authorizing EEOC Commissioners to file charges with the agency); 
Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 n.3 (1967) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 160(a)-(b) (1994), which notes the NLRB's limited authority). 
160 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The case of EEOC v. Sears Roebuck 
Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), illustrates some of the difficulties of proceeding 
without a charge filed by an employee or applicant. In Sears, the EEOC presented only 
statistical evidence supporting its claim of discrimination, without anecdotal evidence of 
instances of discrimination. Id. at 310-12. While not fatal to the claim, the absence of 
such evidence was an important factor in the court's decision that the EEOC did not 
prove discrimination. Id. at 311-12. 
161 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991), the Court 
indicated that the employee could still file a charge with the EEOC despite the arbitration 
agreement. Several circuit courts have permitted the EEOC to litigate cases despite the 
employee's arbitration agreement, although some h_ave restricted the relief available in 
such cases. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 813 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(permitting EEOC to proceed despite arbitration agreement, but precluding relief for 
individual employee who signed arbitration agreement); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & 
Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that EEOC could litigate despite 
employee's arbitration agreement with no limit on relief available). 
162 The NLRB has not decided the effect of such individual arbitrati~n agreements, 
as the Bentley's Luggage case settled. However, the Board does defer to arbitration under 
collective bargaining agreements in which unfair labor practice claims and contract 
claims overlap, reserving jurisdiction to insure that the resolution is not repugnant to the 
statute. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). ''The Board's authority, in 
its discretion, to defer to the arbitration process has never been questioned by the courts 
of appeals, or by the Supreme Court." Id. at 840. However, the deferral is discretionary. 
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating unfair labor 
practice charges even though they might have been the subject of an arbitration 
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These distinctions, however, may not warrant differential treatment of 
NLRA claims and discrimination claims in the context of compulsory 
arbitration of statutory claims. Depending on the language used, the 
arbitration agreement may discourage employees from filing charges under 
either statute based on the belief that the only recourse is arbitration. And the 
very low rate of EEOC litigation provides no realistic opportunity for a 
judicial forum for discrimination claims in which an arbitration agreement 
has been executed. In contrast, the NLRB finds merit in about one-third of 
the charges filed with the agency.163 While many are not litigated, once a 
determination of merit is made, the cases are either litigated or settled with 
relieffor the charging party.164 
B .. The Impact on Mandatory Bargaining Subjects Requires 
Negotiation 
While the argument that classification as a permissive subject leaves the 
employer free to negotiate and implement a waiver individually has some 
persuasive force, a closer examination of the issue leads to the opposite 
conclusion. A brief review of the law relating to individual bargaining is 
instructive. In J.I Case Co. v. NLRB,165 the Court held that individual 
contracts could not be used to defeat collective bargaining.166 While the 
employer is free to hire employees, the terms of employment are set by the 
collective bargaining agreement.167 
proceeding and award. Section tO(a) of the Act expressly makes this plain, and the 
courts have uniformly so held. However, it is equally well established that the Board 
has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise its 
authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental 
aims of the Act. 
Id. at 840 (quoting Int'l Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962)); see also 
Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). "Clearly, agreements 
between private parties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the Board. Therefore, we believe 
the Board may exercise jurisdiction in any case of an unfair labor practice when in its 
discretion its interference is necessary to protect the public rights defined in the Act." Id 
at 1090 (quoting NLRB v. Walt Disney, 146 F.2d 44, 48 (1945)). It might be argued that 
the General Counsel's position in Bentley's Luggage is inconsistent with the deferral 
doctrine, so long as the employee is not prevented from filing a charge to invoke the 
Board's review of the arbitration decision. 
163 Fact Sheet on the National Labor Relations Board (Jan. 8, 2001), at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/facts.htrnl (stating that about one-third of charges filed are found to 
have merit). 
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165 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321U.S.322 (1944). 
166 Id. at 341-42. 
167 Id. at 335-36. 
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Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their 
execution.or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the 
procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to 
collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly 
ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they ·be used to forestall bargaining or 
to limit or condition the terms of .the collective agreement. "The Board 
asserts a public right vested in it as a public body charged in the public 
interest with the duty of preventing ,unfair labor practices." Wherever · 
private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the 
Act.would be reduced to a futility.168 · · 
The employer is prohibited from bypassing the union and negotiating 
directly with the employees, even where employees consent, because it 
subverts the statutory purpose of encouraging collective bargaining.169 The 
J.L Case court suggested, however, that the contract itself could leave areas 
for individual bargaining, by prescribing minimum wages and allowing 
negotiation for higher wages, for example.170 
In National Licorice Co., I'71 the Court also addressed the issue of 
individual contracts.172 There the employer negQtiated individual agreements 
through an employer:-dominated labor org?Jlization that waived employee 
rights to demand a cfosed shop and a collective bargaining agreement, and to 
arbitrate discharge claims.173 The contracts provided an alternative to 
arbitration for employee discharges that consisted of a challenge presented 
directly to the employer.174 The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that 
these contracts violated the statute, finding that the arbitration provision 
"forestall[ ed] collective bargaining with r~spect to discharged emp)oyees" by 
discouraging, if not barring, presentation of discharge grievances through a 
union.175 
Where bargaining over a subject is not mandatory, however, the 
employer is not precluded from making ~ilateral changes, even in existing 
contracts.176 By implication, at least, the employer could also negotiate 
directly with employees.over permissive subjects of bargaining~ as the court 
l68 Id. at 337 (quoting Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940)). 
169 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321U.S.678, 684-85, 687 (1944); 
170 J.L Case, 321 U.S. at 338. 
171 Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 3,?0 (1940). 
172 Id. at 354-55. 
173 Id. at 360. 
114 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U.S. 157, 185-86 (1971). However, such action may unlawfully breach the 
agreement. Id. at 188. 
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of appeals in ALPA so held.177 An exploration of the impact of such 
negotiations in the instant case, however, reveals that the waiver is so 
intertwined with mandatory subjects that individual negotiations without 
union consent should be barred. First, the waiver is nonmandatory, not 
because it does not relate to terms and conditions of employment, but 
because of the possible frustration of the bargaining process that would result 
from finding it a mandatory subject.178 In fact, it does relate to terms and 
conditions of employment. Second, it is not purely a waiver of a claim 
between the employee and the employer, but an agreement to an internal 
method of resolving the dispute.179 The union unquestionably has an interest 
in negotiating the method of dispute resolution, particularly when, as here, 
the dispute relates to terms and conditions of employment and 
nondiscrimination in the workplace, and the Board has so held.180 Third, the 
waiver has such a significant impact on terms and conditions of employment 
that unilateral implementation and individual bargaining must be 
prohibited.181 
Where a subject of bargaining would otherwise be permissive, it may 
become mandatory when it is so intertwined with a mandatory subject of 
bargaining that it vitally affects the terms and conditions of employment of 
177 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 486 
(1999). The analysis herein might apply to permissive bargaining subjects more broadly, 
suggesting that if an employer desires to bargain about a permissive subject, it must 
bargain with the union, not the employees. However, further discussion of this theory is 
beyond the scope of the article. 
178 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. 
179 This distinguishes the instant situation from Phillips Pipe Line Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 
732, 732 (1991), where the Board found, under the unique circumstances of the case, that 
the union was not entitled to demand bargaining over a release requirement that 
accompanied an offer of enhanced severance pay. In that case, the Board did not find that 
the release was so intertwined with the severance that bargaining was required. The 
release, however, related to preexisting claims, not future claims, and participation in the 
program was purely voluntary, with no loss of contractual benefits if the employee 
refused to sign the release. 
180 See Heck's, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1121 (1989) (finding employer violated 
section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally imposing on employees a grievance procedure separate 
from the negotiated procedure). The same analysis would apply to other statutory claims, 
such as claims for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 
(1994), or claims for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 
(1994). 
18l What is likely to occur in this situation is unilateral implementation, rather than 
individual bargaining, because the efficiency and cost savings the employer seeks to 
achieve by arbitration are maximized by establishing a uniform procedure applicable to 
all employees. Estreicher, supra note 133, at 1358-59. 
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the employees. In Star Tribune, 182 the Board found that hiring discrimination 
had such a direct impact on the ~ion's ability to eliminate w9rkplace 
discrimination that the union was entitled to information.that would enable it 
to investigate whether such discrimination was occurring, despite the fact 
that hiring procedures relate to non-bargaining unit members and thus are 
normally non-mandatory bargaining subjects.183 Similarly here, the impact of 
the waiver on mandatory bargaining subjects is so significant that neither 
unilateral implementation nor individual bargaining should be permitted.184 
To understand this impact, it is helpful to consider the possible outcomes 
of negotiation with individual employees (or unilateral implementation). If 
the employer were to implement a requirement that employees arbitrate 
statutory claims, an arbitration procedure would have to be established. One 
alternative would be inclusion of statutory . claims in the collectively 
bargained grievance procedure. It seems beyond debate that such an 
alternative would require the consent of the union.185 Accordingly, it could 
not be implemented unilaterally or individually negotiated with the employee 
absent union agreement. The other alternative is a separate procedure for 
arbitration of statutory claims. The arbitration procedure would be a 
mandatory subject of bargaining becaus~ it is a dispute resolution mechanism 
that settles terms and conditions of employment. While it might initially 
appear that the waiver could be separated from the procedure for negotiation 
purposes,186 further analysis reveals that it is not the case. Negotiation of the 
waiver requires establishment of procedures, and the interrelationship 
between this exclusive arbitration obligation and the contractual rights and 
procedures mandates a conclusion that the union. must be involved in both 
the decision to require statutory arbitration and the procedures to be utilized. 
The primary issues likely to be included in an arbitration procedure for 
statutory claims are complaints of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, 
182 Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543 (1989). 
l83 Id. at 548. 
184 However, this conclusion does not convert the waiver to a mandatory bargaining 
subject. See Borden, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 396, 399 (1986). The waiver is non-mandatory, 
not because it has no impact on terms and conditions of employment, but because 
injection of waiver issues into the collective bargaining process frustrates the process by 
allowing one party to condition bargaining on waiver of a statutory right unrelated to the 
statutory objectives of collective bargaining and labor peace. 
185 See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1991); 
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131F.3d1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997); NLRB v. 
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1153, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). 
186 See Phillips Pipe Line Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 732, 737 (1991). 
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religion, national origin, age, and disability.187 Yet most collective 
bargaining agreements also prohibit discrimination as a matter of contract, 
and many refer to discrimination statutes in a way that does not constitute an 
exclusive agreement to arbitrate statutory claims under the contract.188 There 
would be obvious overlap between a claim under the statutory procedure and 
one under the contractual procedure. Indeed, the statutory claims might be 
arbitrable under both.189 Moreover, discrimination and other legal claims are 
most likely to involve discharges190 and virtually every collective bargaining 
agreement contains a requirement of cause for termination that is subject to 
the grievance and arbitration procedure.191 Other issues likely to be the 
subject of discrimination claims, such as demotions and other discipline,192 
disputes over pay rates,193 and denials of promotion,194 will also typically be 
187 Also included are state statutory claims, other federal statutory claims such as the 
Fair Labor Standards Act or the Family Medical Leave Act, or common law claims such 
as discrimination for filing a workers compensation claim. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001); Lingle v. Norge Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 
(1988); Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212, 220 {1985). For a thorough 
discussion of preemption and arbitration agreements, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 
1990s, 73 DENY. U.L. REV. 1017 (1996). 
188 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
l89 Parties to contractual arbitration procedures can authorize arbitrators to decide 
statutory claims. Harry Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The 'Common 
Law of the Shop' v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 79 (1977). 
190 John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (finding that 59% of 
employment discrimination suits alleged unlawful discharge); Peter Siegelman & John J. 
Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from its Tip: A Comparison of Published and 
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1133, 1164 
(1990) (noting that most of the growth in employment discrimination litigation has been 
in lawsuits alleging discriminatory discharge). 
191 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 884, 887 (stating both that 94% of 
collective bargaining agreements contain a just cause provision and that a significant 
percentage of arbitration cases involve discharge or discipline); COOPER, supra note 2, at 
258 (indicating that labor arbitrators hear more discipline and discharge cases than any 
other type of case and that arbitrators commonly infer protection from unjust termination 
even where the contract does not provide it expressly). Discrimination in a broad sense is 
often an issue in arbitration cases involving discharge because just cause has been 
interpreted to require "industrial equal protection." Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, 
Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 85 DUKE L.J. 594, 621 
(1985); see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 934-38. 
192 See supra note 190; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 780-84. 
l93 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 686-90, 739, 785-89 (citing cases). 
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covered by the collective bargaining agreement, 195 and are mandatory 
bargaining subjects.196 Because of the substantial overlap between 
contractual issues and statutory issues, the procedures governing arbitrations 
of statutory issues, and the arbitrations themselves, will impact the 
contractual arbitration procedure and arbitrations thereunder. 
Like the alternative procedure in National Licorice Co., 197 the statutory 
procedure may discourage employees from using the contractual procedure 
to vindicate their rights.198 Certainly, any requirement that the employees 
waive their right to file a contractual grievance by filing a claim under the 
statutory procedure would have such a substantial impact on the contractual 
grievance procedure that it could not be implemented without union input.199 
In addition, even if the statutory arbitration agreement makes clear that 
employees remain free to use b.oth procedures for overlapping claims, the 
statutory process may affect the contractual process in several significant 
ways. The statutory arbitration procedure required, as· well as the number of 
other claims pending under each procedure, may determine which case is 
194 Id. at 775-79, 845-83. Gender and age have arisen in the context of promotion 
and job selection arbitrations often enough to be separately discussed in this 
comprehensive treatise on labor arbitration. Id. at 87 5-78, 880-82. 
195 Specific harassment provision~ are less common, but harassment claims may be 
arbitrated under discrimination provisions of the agreement.. Mary K. O'Melveny, 
Negotiating the Minefields: Selected Issues for Labor Unions Addressing Sexual 
Harassment Complaints by Represented Employees, 15 LAB. LAW. 321, 350 (2000) 
(suggesting that unions negotiate contractual prohibitions on harassment and retaliation); 
Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation 
Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 7 (1999) (indicating that number of 
contract provisions expressly prohibiting harassment is likely to increase). Labor 
arbitrators hear cases involving discipline for harassment, cases involving 
accommodation of religious beliefs, and cases involving accommodation of individuals 
with disabilities. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 1056-73, 792-94. 
196 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1994); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 864-82, 887-89, 
893-96 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992). 
197 Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940). 
198 See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. 
199 Indeed, conditioning employment on prospective waiver of the right to grieve 
under the collectively bargained procedure might well be found unlawful. See Retlaw 
Broad. Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 984, 993 (1993) (finding unlawful employer's conditioning of 
reemployment on waiver of the NLRA's section 7 rights). See also Kolman/Athey Div. 
of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92, 96 (1991) (finding election of remedies 
provision to be non-mandatory subject of bargaining). Similarly, it might be argued that 
conditioning employment on waiver of the right to litigate in general might violate 
section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA because it coerces employees in the exercise of their right to 
engage in concerted activity. This theory depends on the interpretation of concerted 
activity and would apply not only in the union setting, but also in the nonunion setting. 
Further analysis of this theory is beyond the scope of this article. 
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heard first. The parties in the second proceeding may be faced with 
arguments that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of some or 
all of the issues before the arbitrator.200 Although contractual arbitration 
decisions do not bind future arbitrators,201 a contractual arbitrator may look 
to a decision by a statutory arbitrator in interpreting overlapping issues, 
either in the same case or similar cases.202 Thus, arbitration of a statutory 
claim may have greater implications for contractual interpretation than 
litigation (and may be more likely to occur).203 
If the statutory arbitration occurs first, the union may be faced with 
issues of collateral estoppel in the collectively bargained procedure.204 
Alternatively, if the contractual arbitration proceeds first, the employee and 
employer in the statutory procedure will face collateral estoppel issues. This 
potential for collateral estoppel may discourage the employee from 
participating in the contractual procedure, which is under the control of the 
union, out of concern that it may have an adverse effect on the statutory 
claim.205 Such a decision would not prevent the union from proceeding, but 
would certainly hamper its ability to prevail and therefore adversely affect 
the union's ability to enforce the collective bargaining agreement.206 Given 
200 See Timothy J. Heinsz, Grieve It Again: Of Stare Decisis, Res Judicata and 
Collateral Estoppel in Labor Arbitration, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 275 (1997). This problem may 
be especially significant if the exclusive arbitration agreement purports to require 
arbitration, rather than litigation, of class claims. Statutory and contractual rights of 
employees represented by the union may be arbitrated without a mechanism for their 
participation or protection, and later attempts to assert those rights may be barred. For a 
thorough discussion of class actions and arbitration see Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 1 (2000). 
201 See Heinsz, supra note 200, at 286-87. 
202 Id. at 288-90, 293-94 (indicating that most arbitrators are inclined to follow 
earlier awards on the same issue in the absence of unusual circumstances dictating a 
different decision). 
203 See Clark, supra note 134, at 177 (stating that the availability and lower cost of 
arbitration may encourage more employees to file claims against the employer); Lisa B. 
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. 
POL. J. 189, 189-90 (1997) (stating the same). 
204 Of course, application of collateral estoppel may benefit the union and employee 
in the contractual procedure if the employee prevails, but this only further supports the 
need for negotiation. 
205 An employee's attorney might well advise the employee to avoid participation in 
the contractual procedure or attempt to persuade the union not to proceed with the 
grievance. 
206 This is precisely the sort of effect that concerned the Court in National Licorice 
and Member Stephens in Kolman/Athey. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78, 171-
75. 
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the potential impact of statutory arbitration on contractual claims, the union 
has a strong interest in insuring that if there is a statutory arbitration 
procedure, it is a fair procedure likely to. yield unbiased and accurate 
decisions. If the arbitrator is not neutral or the employee has no right to 
discover necessary information relevant to the claim,~07 a decision that 
adversely affects the union's ability to eliminate workplace discrimination, 
both a mandatory bargaining subject and legal obligation,208 might issue.209 
Collective bargaining negotiations about· whether to have a statutory 
procedure and the form of the procedure could address the application of 
collateral estoppeI.210 But the potential for adver!le impact on collectively 
bargained rights requires union involvement in negotiation of both the 
arbitration requirement and the arbitration procedure. 
The union also may have a strong interest in remedies available under the 
statutory procedure, because they may impact collectively bargained rights. 
For example, an order of promotion may impact the seniority rights of other 
employees in the bargaining unit.211 If the union is not a party to the 
proceedings, it cannot assert the rights of other employees or the possible 
conflict with the collective bargaining agreement. In court, the union could 
207 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to compel 
arbitration of statutory claim because of the unfairness of the procedure). 
208 Unions, like employers, have legal obligations not to discriminate on the basis of 
race, gender, religion, national origin, age, ~d disability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994) 
(proscribing discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion); 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) 
(1994) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 
12112(a)-{b) (1994) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of disability). Some courts 
have imposed on the union a duty to protect employees from employer discrimination. 
E.g., Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 
1978); Macklin v. Spector ·Freight Sys., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987) (finding the union liable for 
race discrimination for refusing to file discrimination grievances despite an absence of 
union racial animus). For discussion of union nondiscrimination obligations, see Note, 
Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1980); Ann C. 
Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI 
L. REv. 567, 579-87 (1994). 
209 It is not a sufficient answer to say that the employee could refuse to arbitrate if 
the procedure was unfair. The employee might not refuse because of the cost oflitigation, 
and an employee who tried to avoid arbitration in favor of litigation might be 
unsuccessful. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991). 
210 Heinsz, supra note 200, at 286-87. 
211 See, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Rubber & 
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 769-72 (1983) (finding that employer who resisted 
compliance with labor arbitration award violated the seniority provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement, since the agreement conflicted with conciliation agreement entered 
into to resolve discrimination litigation). 
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be joined as a party to help resolve these issues.212 In arbitration, the 
statutory arbitration procedure would determine the role of the union, and if 
the employer unilaterally imposed the agreement on the employees, rights 
under the collective bargaining agreement might be affected without any 
mechanism for union participation.213 Again, this demonstrates the 
interrelationship of statutory and contractual arbitration. 
A statutory arbitration procedure also might contain provisions that 
prevent the union from obtaining information about discrimination against 
bargaining unit members. Indeed, one of the employer interests in preferring 
arbitration over litigation is confidentiality.214 A union's inability to obtain 
such information might interfere with its ability to represent other employees 
and to eliminate discrimination from the workplace.215 Not only is 
discrimination a mandatory subject of bargaining, but the union has a legal 
duty of nondiscrimination both under the NLRA and the federal 
antidiscrimination statutes.216 Precluding the union from participation in the 
212 Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 717 F.2d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(noting union intervention at remedial stage in case involving impact of reinstatement of 
discriminatorily-discharged flight attendants upon seniority of existing workers 
represented by union). 
213 Such a result could create difficulties similar to those faced in W.R. Grace, 461 
U.S. at 771-72, in which the union's action to enforce an arbitration award reached the 
Supreme Court because the employer had entered a conciliation agreement in a 
discrimination action, without union participation, which conflicted with the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
214 Clark, supra note 134, at 177. 
215 See Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 549, 551 (1989) (requiring employer to 
provide union with information relevant to alleged hiring discrimination because of 
impact on union efforts to eliminate workplace discrimination). 
216 See supra notes 207-09. Both the NLRB and the courts have read section 
8(b)(l)(A) to encompass a duty of fair representation which precludes unions from 
discriminating in negotiations and handling of grievances. See NLRB v. Local 106, Glass 
Bottle Blowers Assoc., 520 F.2d 693, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding Board's 
decision requiring two local unions segregated on basis of sex to merge and to 
discontinue practice of segregated handling of grievances based on sex, since practice 
violated section 8(b)(l)(A)); NLRB v. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local No. 1581, 489 
F.2d 635, 638 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding Boards' decision that union must discontinue 
negotiating preferences in hiring based on citizenship and residence of prospective 
employee's family that were in violation of section 8(b)(l)(A)); Agosto v. Corr. Officers 
Benevolent Assoc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying summary 
judgment to union which offered no explanation for refusal to process sexual harassment 
claim, demonstrating that union may have committed sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII and thereby may have breached its duty of fair representation); Seep v. 
Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that 
sex discrimination which violates Title VII may also breach the duty of fair 
representation, but finding no such discrimination in the case). 
552 
IS BARGAINING WITH THE UNION REQU.JRED 
decision about whether to require arbitration of statutory claims ~d the 
implementation of a statutory arbitration procedure would interfere with its 
ability to fulfill this duty. 
Permitting the employer to bypass the union and neg!)tiate directly with 
the employees for such a procedure, or to impose it as a condition of 
employment, undermines the uniqn in the eyes of th~ employees. Like the 
procedure for standardless, discretionary merit increases in McClatchy 
Newspapers, unilateral institution of a dispute resolution procedure that 
impacts the collectively bargained griev~nce and arbitration procedure, and 
may well impact other terms and conditi~~s of employment, diminishes the 
union's representative role, resulting in a de-collectivization ofbargaining.217 
The fact that the union may have no role in litjgation of statutory claims does 
not vitiate the need for the union to have a role in· an internal dispute 
resolution procedure that affects terms and conditions of employment in 
order to preserve its role as a collective bargaining agent. The limited role of 
the union in the former procedure is attributable to Congress, and will not be 
viewed as a sign of the union's ineffectivene~s as a collective bargaining 
representative, wliile the latter well might. · 
In addition, permitting the employer to negotiate individually with 
employees for a statutory procedure for arbitration claims undermines 
majority rule. In Emporium Capwell Co. v .. Western Addition Community 
Organization,218 the Supreme Court found that concerted activity by 
minority members. of the bargaining unit to pressure the employer to address 
discrimination claims outside the grievance and arbitration process as 
unprotected.219 The Court was concerned with the negative impact on the 
principle of majority rule and the collective bargaining process that would 
result from permitting employees to bypass the collectively bargained 
procedure for resolving discrimination complaints to deal directly with the 
employer.220 This concern is equally present when it is the employer who 
seeks to bypass the majority representative and deal directly with the 
employees on discrimination complaints. Moreover, should the individual 
employees desire to act collectively to negotiat~ with the employer or to 
resist employer efforts to impose a statutory arbitration procedure, the 
rationale of Emporium Capwell would deprive them of protection by the Act, 
rendering them subject to termination or other retaliation by the employer. 
217 McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1386, 1391 (1996); enforced, 131 
F.3d 1026, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Toledo Blade Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 626, 628-33 
(1989) (Stephens, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom., Toledo Typographical Union No. 63 v. 
NLRB, 907 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
218 Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
21 9 Id. at 70. 
220 Id. at 62-68. 
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This completes the decollectivization of the relationship because the 
employer can bypass the union and prevent the employees from acting 
collectively as well. 
One might argue that the problems cited above are the effects of a 
decision to implement a statutory arbitration procedure, and can be dealt with 
by requiring the employer to bargain with the union over the effects of the 
decisions, but not the decision itself.221 However, this ignores the effect of 
decollectivization of the bargaining relationship. In addition, cases involving 
effects bargaining exempt the decision from bargaining because of its 
entrepreneurial aspects.222 The employer's interests in unencumbered 
decision making, secrecy, flexibility, and speed outweigh any benefit to 
bargaining over the decision despite its impact on terms and conditions of 
employment.223 An examination of those interests here establishes that 
exempting the decision from bargaining is not required. The employer's 
interests in confining disputes to arbitration include cost, speed, and 
confidentiality.224 Cost is not an employer interest that has been given 
substantial weight in avoiding bargaining.225 While confidentiality may be 
desirable from the employer's point of view, keeping statutory violations 
secret cannot justify allowing unilateral imposition of arbitration.226 Speed of 
decision-making supports a limitation on bargaining but, unlike the decisions 
exempted from bargaining, such as partial closure of facilities, speedy 
decisions on statutory discrimination claims do not further preservation of 
221 I am grateful to Professor Samuel Estreicher for suggesting this analogy at the 
Symposium. 
222 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
223 Id. at 682-83. 
224 Clark, supra note 134, at 176-77. 
225 Cost would always favor a determination that bargaining is not required. 
Moreover, one aspect of the cost reduction derives from the prediction that arbitrators 
will be less likely to award punitive damages. Clark, supra note 134, at 176. Relief from 
liability for statutory violations is similarly an interest that should not be given weight in 
avoiding negotiations. 
226 Indeed, the critics of arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution generally, 
have focused on the private nature of arbitration, arguing that it is inappropriate and 
contrary to public justice values to privatize litigation of statutory claims. See, e.g., 
Malin, supra note 2, at 594-97; Joseph D. Garrison, Pro: The Employee's Perspective: 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes Little More Than a Waiver of a Worker's 
Rights, DISP. REsOL. J., Fall 1997, at 15, 18; Stone, supra note 187, at 1046-47 
(collecting comments of various critics); Irving R. Kaufman, Refonn for a System in 
Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 29 
(1990). See also Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A 
Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers 
Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1238 (1993) (arguing for de novo review of 
arbitral decisions on discrimination claims to preserve public justice values). 
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capital investment or continuation of the ~usiness. Thus, the value of 
bargaining outweighs the burdens on the employer.227 
A second argument that bargaining is not required flows from the 
imposition of arbitration agreements at the time of hire. Since the applicants 
agreeing to arbitration are not employees, the union does not represent them 
and cannot bargain for their terms and conditions of hire. As noted in J.L 
Case,228 however, once the applicants become employees their terms and 
conditions of employment are governed by the union contract.229 Whatever 
contract the employer negotiated with them must yield to the bargaining 
requirements of the statute. Furthermore, while hiring procedures are 
generally outside the scope of mandatory bargaining; when they impact the 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees, bargaining will be 
required.230 Here, as established above, arbitration of statutory claims will 
impact the terms and conditions of employment of the employees, for such 
arbitration will not take place until the individual becomes an employee, and 
will, with the possible exception of disputes over hiring discrimination, 
involve disputes that arise from employment.· The employer could not 
negotiate a different wage rate with an employee in hiring and argue that the 
union had no interest because it does not represent 4tpplicants. Neither can it 
negotiate an arbitration procedure that applies after hiring, unless it is 
privileged to negotiate such an agreement with existing employees.231 
Finally, it might be suggested that both litigatipn of statutory 
discrimination claims under procedures imposed by law and voluntary post-
dispute arbitration of individual discrimination claims have a similar impact 
227 A detennination that bargaining over the decision to impose statutory arbitration 
is not required, however, would not vitiate the argtiments herein that bargaining over the 
effects, the statutory arbitration procedure, is mandated. 
228 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
229 Id. at 335-37. 
230 See United States Postal Serv., 308 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1308 {1992) (holding that 
employer is required to bargain about hiring practices when union has an objective basis 
for believing that the process may be discriminatory), enforcement denied, 18 F.3d 1089, 
1092 (3d Cir. 1994) (agreeing with Board finding of unfair labor practice but refusing to 
enforce affirmative portion of remedial order because of detennination that, as a matter of 
fact, the new hiring procedure did not have discriminatory impact), remanded, 314 
N.L.R.B. 901, 901 (1994) (accepting Court's decision and modifying remedial order to 
eliminate affirmative requirement that employer bargain and supply the information not 
previously supplied); Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 549, 551 (1989) (holding that 
employer must provide the union with information relevant to alleged sex discrimination 
in hiring because possible discrimination in the hiring process is so intertwined with 
possible discrimination in employment that to bar union investigation of the hiring 
process impairs its ability to eliminate discrimination in employment). 
231 See United States Postal Serv., 308 N.L.R.B. at 1308. 
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on mandatory subjects. Since there is no requirement of union involvement 
in statutory litigation or settlement, including agreements to alternative 
dispute resolution methods of settlement, the employer should be able to 
implement a mandatory statutory arbitration procedure without union input. 
Clearly, litigation and individual settlement of statutory claims may impact 
the union's ability to eliminate workplace discrimination. That impact, 
however, is dictated by the statutes. In addition, some of the effects on 
contractual rights are less likely to occur as a result oflitigation. Where cases 
are actually litigated, rather than settled, information about the employer's 
discrimination will be publicly available and therefore accessible to the union 
to further its efforts to eliminate discrimination. Because of the relative speed 
of arbitration as compared to litigation,232 the collateral estoppel issues are 
less likely to arise where claims are litigated. And, as noted, the opportunity 
to join the union as a party exists in the judicial forum. The impact of 
exclusive arbitration of statutory claims on the collective bargaining process, 
including arbitration, is quite different and significant. 
The effect of voluntary post-dispute arbitration is also significantly 
different. It is the cumulative effect of mandatory arbitration of all statutory 
claims that poses risks to the collectively bargained terms and conditions of 
employment. The inability to obtain information about discrimination in one 
particular case will not substantially affect the union's ability to remedy 
workplace discrimination, but the inability to access such information about 
any case will. Similarly, the impact of the collateral estoppel effects increases 
when all statutory cases are arbitrated because the union may well face a 
collateral estoppel argument in large numbers of arbitration cases, not only 
discrimination cases but also just cause cases and others in which the 
employee contractual right is unrelated to discrimination.233 Similarly, the 
potential effect of remedial provisions on collectively bargained rights 
increases with the number of cases arbitrated.234 Accordingly, where the 
employer desires to bring the statutory claims into a workplace dispute 
resolution procedure that impacts on terms and conditions of employment, 
the employer should not be permitted to do so unilaterally. 
232 Clark, supra note 134, at 176; Malin, supra note 2, at 593 (quoting Paul Tobias, 
"an icon of the plaintiffs' bar"). 
233 See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text, discussing the substantial 
potential for overlapping claims. In addition, arbitration under a collective bargaining 
agreement does not preclude judicial litigation of a discrimination claim. Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 43, 47, 59-60 (1974). But see Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. 
Supp. 2d 320, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
234 The union may litigate one case like W.R. Grace, but may have insufficient 
resources to litigate many. Therefore, it is essential that the union negotiate a right to 
intervene at the arbitral stage to protect employee rights. 
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VI. THEFu'ruRE OF ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS IN THE 
UNIONIZED WORKPLACE 
Advocates of workplace arbitration of statutory claims need not fear that 
this interpretation sounds the death knell for arbitration of statutory claims in 
the unionized workplace.235 It merely requires that the employer obtain the 
agreement of the union (and if the union cannot waive employee rights, of 
the employees) to arbitration of statutory claims. A union and employer 
could agree to arbitrate statutory claims under the collectively bargained 
procedure or under a separate procedure. The sep!lfate procedure qould be 
negotiated to best serve the interests of the employer and the employees in 
the particular workplace. A union uninterested in negotiating the d~tails of a 
statutory arbitration agreement could authorize the e:qiployer to deal directly 
with the employ~es or applicants.236 · 
Negotiation with the union may provide some· aclvantages for the 
employer. Employees may be more willing to buy into a procedure 
negotiated by their representative, and therefore, to utilize it. This would 
minimize efforts to avoid the procedure and proceed to litigation, whether the 
procedure is mandatory or voluntary. In addition, the eµiployees may utilize 
the procedure in lieu of filing an EEOC charge, which could be litigated by 
the agency despite the arbitration agre~ment. Thus, the employer may avoid 
both the time· and effort required to respond to EEOC charges and the 
potential for EEOC litigation. The union's involvement in negotiation may 
encourage courts to enforce the procedure because waiver of the judicial 
forum may be considered more knowing and voluntary, and the protections 
of the union may be deemed to make the process fairer to the employee.237 
While the employer could not lawfully conditi9p. employment on the 
employee's agreement not to file grievances over claims that involve 
overlapping contractual and statutory issues, an agreement with the union 
and the employee providing the employee with a choice of forum, but only 
235 Even if it did so, the low unionization rate minimizes the impact and leaves 
multitudes of employees and employers free to utilize arbitration. And even if every 
possible private sector employer was unionized, mi11ions of supervisors and managers 
would sti11 be candidates for arbitration. 
236 However, the employer could not insist to impasse that the union agree to a 
contract provision authorizing direct dealing on the ·arbitration procedure. See Toledo 
Typographical Union No. 63 v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1220, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
237 Cj Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), (holding that 
employees who do not "knowingly'' agree cannot be required to submit Title VII claims 
to arbitration); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phi11ips, 173 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(invalidating agreement to arbitrate because of unfairness of employer-imposed 
procedures). · 
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one forum, might well be enforced.238 The employer could thereby confine 
the employee to one forum, eliminating two bites at the apple that otherwise 
would remain available to the employee in the unionized workplace because 
of the overlap of contractual and statutory claims. 239 
Thus, rather than bypassing the union and risking litigation, employers 
should attempt to negotiate arbitration agreements with the union. If it is 
advantageous to both parties, an agreement will be reached which may 
benefit all concerned. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With the increase in legislation relating to individual employees in recent 
years, there has been a corresponding rise in situations in which individual 
rights and collective rights intersect in the workplace. Accommodating 
collective interests and individual interests, and the NLRA and other statutes, 
is a continuing process. The requisite accommodation is best served here by 
providing for a union role in negotiating any statutory arbitration process, 
while barring the employer from forcing statutory arbitration on the 
employees, either through the union or individually. This approach preserves 
the benefits of arbitration where they exist, while providing protection from 
employer overreaching to avoid the obligations imposed by statutes enacted 
to protect employee rights. Employees who have chosen union representation 
retain the benefits of that representation and do not sacrifice other rights as a 
result of that choice. The employer also may benefit from this approach 
through negotiation of an arbitration procedure that is utilized as an 
alternative to litigation and survives judicial challenge. In this way arbitration 
can serve its intended purpose-to provide a low cost, speedy, and efficient 
dispute resolution method for all parties. 
238 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text. 
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